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GENDERLESS MARRIAGE,
INSTITUTIONAL REALITIES, AND
JUDICIAL ELISION
MONTE NEIL STEWART*
elision, noun . . . . The act or an instance of omitting something.1
elide, verb . . . . To eliminate or leave out of consideration.2
Premised on the uncontroversial notion that marriage is a social
institution and then informed by social institutional studies, the social
institutional argument for man/woman marriage is a sufficient
response to the variety of constitutional challenges leveled at the laws
sustaining that institution. That is so because of what the argument
succeeds in demonstrating. It demonstrates that marriage, like all
social institutions, is constituted by a web of shared public meanings;
that these meanings teach, form, and transform individuals; and that
in this way, these meanings provide vital social goods (which are
described). The argument further demonstrates that, with its power to
suppress social meanings, the law can radically change and even
deinstitutionalize man/woman marriage, with concomitant loss of the
institution’s social goods; that genderless marriage is a radically
different institution than man/woman marriage, as evidenced by the

Copyright © 2006 Monte Neil Stewart and Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy.
* This Article is available on-line at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djclpp and at
http://www.manwomanmarriage.org. This Article considers developments through December 8,
2005.
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
2. Id.
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large divergence in the nature of their respective social goods; and that
society can have at any time only one of those two institutions
denominated marriage. Finally, the argument demonstrates that,
although the law is potent to replace the man/woman marriage
institution with the genderless marriage institution, it is powerless to
allow same-sex couples into the privileged marriage institution we
have always known; and that law-mandated genderless marriage will
sweep in not only all couples who marry in the future but the
man/woman couples who married into the old institution.
With its demonstration that the legal redefinition of marriage will
in time (and probably sooner than later) result in the loss of the vital
social goods uniquely provided by the man/woman marriage
institution, the social institutional argument is thus an argument that
society (and hence government) has a compelling interest in continuing
to sustain that institution of betterment.
Yet to date, the courts mandating genderless marriage have chosen
(consciously it appears) to elide rather than engage the argument.
After making the social institutional argument, this Article examines
in detail the elision phenomenon, as seen in such cases as Goodridge
from Massachusetts, Halpern from Ontario, and EGALE from British
Columbia. In this way, the Article identifies a number of manners of
elision; it then critiques the judicial performance relative to each.
Finally, the Article, anticipating that courts will eventually address
them, evaluates two counter-arguments that engage to some extent the
realities advanced by the social institutional argument.
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I
INTRODUCTION

T

he stuff of the marriage debate is not static. That is particularly
true in the courts, where the legal definition of marriage is
debated most thoroughly and most consequentially. Since 1971,
when a same-sex couple first advanced the claim that constitutional
guarantees mandated the redefinition of marriage from the union of
a man and a woman to the union of any two persons,3 each side’s
bundle of arguments has changed and is still changing. Much of the

3. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
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change entails a refinement of arguments, a wholly understandable
phenomenon in a judicial/political engagement hard fought for many
years now.4 But an important part of that change is the dropping and
adding of entire arguments.
The dropping is invariably in response to a pattern of judicial
rejection. Examples include the “definitional preclusion,” “natural
limits,” and “marriage as supra-legal construct” arguments, each of
which urged in its distinctive way that something essential to
marriage precludes alteration by the law. In a triumph for the
undiluted positivist view of law, the courts generally rejected these
arguments, and consequently the proponents of man/woman
marriage no longer use them.5 Likewise, the proponents of genderless
marriage6 have largely abandoned, after judicial rejection, the

4. The judicial/political engagement began in earnest with the decision of the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). For a descriptive overview of that
engagement in the United States, see William C. Duncan, The Litigation to Redefine Marriage:
Equality and Social Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004); in Canada, see F.C. DeCoste, The
Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41
ALBERTA L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2003), and Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-sex Marriage
in Canada and the United States: Controversy over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social
Institution (2005) (paper presented at the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment Symposium,
Brigham Young University, Sep. 9, 2005), available at http://www.law2.byu.edu/marriage_family/
Sept9conference/draft%20papers/NBalaSame%20Sex%20Marr%20Can%20USA%202005drft.pdf
(soon to be published in the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law); and in South
Africa, see J.A. Robinson, The Evolution of the Concept of Marriage in South Africa: The
Influence of the Bill of Rights (2005) (paper presented at the 12th World Conference of the
International Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, July 19–23 2005).
5. Instead of denying the power of the law to radically alter a core constitutive meaning of
marriage, proponents now focus instead on the wisdom of so using the law.
6. A word about terminology: Rather than use the more common phrase same-sex
marriage or gay marriage, this article uses the phrase genderless marriage to refer to the form of
civil marriage legally defined as the union of any two persons. The phrase same-sex marriage is
subtly misleading; although the legal definition of civil marriage as the union of any two persons
allows same-sex couples to marry, it of course also allows a woman and a man to marry, and
everywhere the debate focuses on one legally recognized relationship known as marriage, not two.
The phrase same-sex marriage thus conveys the sense (erroneous) of a legally recognized marriage
separate or different from the marriage of a man and a woman. This article refers to civil
marriage defined as the union of a man and a woman as man/woman marriage.
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argument premised on the federal constitution’s eighth amendment
that precluding same-sex couples from marrying constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.7
Proponents have also added new arguments that were not
effectively or centrally a part of the earlier debate. There is now the
“conservative” argument for genderless marriage, focusing on the
beneficial effects entry into marriage may have on gay men.8 On the
man/woman marriage side, new arguments arise from institutional
studies9 and from critical review of genderless marriage proponents’
use of personal relationship theory.10
This Article addresses one of the new arguments advanced in
support of man/woman marriage and now drawing judicial

Genderless is used instead of non-gendered and man/woman instead of gendered because, as a
matter of contemporary language usage, to use the words gendered and non-gendered could be
seen as an endorsement of certain versions of social constructionist thought. Although those
versions may be valid, this article stands neutral on the validity question for reasons made clear
elsewhere. See Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 35–
36, 71, 75–85 (2004), available at
http://www.manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/jrm.pdf,
[hereinafter Stewart].
7. E.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
8. E.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996); Andrew Sullivan,
The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, TIME, June 30, 2003, at 76.
Maggie Gallagher suggests “that the arguments in favor of gay marriage, developed over the
last thirty years, have largely stopped developing. These arguments have had a powerful impact
on public opinion, particularly legal elites, over the same period. But to these now well-worn
arguments, little new has been added in recent months or even years.” Maggie Gallagher, (How)
Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U.
ST. THOMAS L. J. 33, 34 (2004).
9. E.g., Monte Neil Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and
Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 560–67, 589–95, [hereinafter Stewart & Duncan] available at
http://manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/Marriage_Betrayal_of_Perez.pdf; Stewart, supra note 6;
Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S
NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9, 15 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 2004) [hereinafter
DIVORCING MARRIAGE].
10. E.g., DANIEL CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN
NORTH AMERICA (Council on Family Law, 2005), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/
pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf; Stewart, supra note 6, at 85–86, 95–99.
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attention, the argument from social institutional studies.11 This
argument teaches that the social institution of marriage, like all
institutions, is constituted by a web of shared public meanings; that
these meanings teach, form, and transform individuals; and that in
this way, these meanings provide vital social goods. The argument
further demonstrates that with its power to suppress social meanings,
the law can radically change and even deinstitutionalize man/woman
marriage, with concomitant loss of the institution’s social goods; that
genderless marriage is a radically different institution than
man/woman marriage, as evidenced by the large divergence in the
nature of their respective social goods; that society can have at any
time only one of those two institutions denominated marriage; that
although the law is potent to replace the man/woman marriage
institution with the genderless marriage institution, it is powerless to
allow same-sex couples into the privileged marriage institution we
have always known; and that law-mandated genderless marriage will
sweep in not only same-sex couples, and not only all couples who
marry in the future, but the man/woman couples who married into
the old institution. With its demonstration that the legal redefinition
of marriage will in time and probably sooner than later result in the
loss of the vital social goods uniquely provided by the man/woman
marriage institution, the social institutional argument is thus an
argument that society (and hence government) has a compelling
interest in continuing to sustain that institution of betterment. In this
way, the social institutional argument is a sufficient answer to the
variety of constitutional challenges leveled against man/woman
marriage. Yet to date, the courts holding for genderless marriage

11. See infra Part III; see also Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
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have chosen (consciously it appears) to elide rather than engage the
argument.
This Article sets forth the social institutional argument in some
detail in Part II, then examines in Part III the phenomenon of
judicial elision of the argument. Part IV, anticipating that courts will
eventually address them, evaluates two counter-arguments that
engage to some extent the realities advanced by the social
institutional argument. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II
MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION
Marriage is a social institution,12 and, accordingly, what can be
said accurately about all social institutions can be said accurately of
the institution of marriage. Social institutional studies provide a
wealth of explanation regarding social institutions: what constitutes
them, how they provide various social goods, how they educate,
form, and transform individuals, how society (especially through the
law) reinforces, alters, or destroys (deinstitutionalizes) these
institutions, and how such changes affect individuals and society.
Before setting forth those understandings and applying them to
the legal definition of marriage, however, I relate a simple human
experience that shows the real-life workings of the concepts that
follow.
A. Olympic Skaters and Brown Loafers
After winning a spot on the American team headed to the 1960
Olympic Winter Games in Squaw Valley, California, eighteen-year-

12. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“[T]he marriage relation [is]
an institution more basic in our civilization than any other.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (“Marriage is a vital social institution.”).
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old speed skater Barbara Lockhart decided to learn Russian.13 At that
time, the Soviet Union’s speed skaters were the best in the world, and
Barbara wanted to become acquainted with them and even establish
some friendships. She succeeded. Klara Guseva, who won the gold
medal in the 1,000 meter race, and Barbara spent a fair amount of
time together at Squaw Valley and became friends.
Near the end of the Games, Barbara and two American
teammates were visiting in their Olympic Village dorm room. Klara
entered, removed the slippers she was wearing, and began trying on
the American athletes’ shoes. She seemed particularly pleased with a
pair of brown loafers. With the loafers on her feet, Klara walked out.
The Americans watched dumbfounded. Klara kept the shoes for her
own use, and the flummoxed Americans never could bring
themselves to seek the shoes’ return.
The profound differences in Barbara’s and Klara’s respective
conducts regarding the brown loafers, and indeed their respective
self-identities in that context, are readily explained by
understandings of social institutions. I turn to those understandings
now.
B. Understandings from Institutional Studies
One of the most important understandings is that social
institutions are constituted in large measure by shared public
meanings. Although in pedestrian use the word “institution” may
conjure up an image of an edifice constructed of steel, concrete, and
glass, a social institution is not that. Rather, it is “constituted by

13. Barbara Lockhart related this experience orally to the author in September, 2005, and
then reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of the written account appearing in the text. Dr.
Lockhart has been a professor of exercise science at Temple University, the University of Iowa,
and Brigham Young University.

H8I

01__STEWART.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:33:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

complex webs of social meaning.”14 John Searle explains this social
reality using the example of another social institution, money:
[W]e can say, for example, in order that the concept “money”
apply to the stuff in my pocket, it has to be the sort of thing that
people think is money. If everybody stops believing it is money, it
ceases to function as money, and eventually ceases to be money. .
. . [I]n order that a type of thing should satisfy the definition, in
order that it should fall under the concept of money, it must be
believed to be, or used as, or regarded as, etc., satisfying the
definition. . . . And what goes for money goes for elections,
private property, wars, voting, promises, marriages, buying and
selling, political offices, and so on.15

The shared meanings—both formal and informal—that
constitute a social institution interact and are interdependent; each
meaning affects and is dependent on all the others.16
Social institutions shape and guide individuals’ identities,
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct. An institution “supplies to the
people who participate in it what they should aim for, dictates what is
acceptable or effective for them to do, and teaches how they must
relate to other members of the institution and to those on the
outside.”17 This profound influence ought not to be underestimated;
institutions “shape[] what those who participate in [them] think of

14. Stewart, supra note 6, at 83. An important foundational work in contemporary social
institutional theory is MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986).
15. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 32 (1995) (emphasis added).
16. Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social
Structure, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19, 19 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee
eds., 1998) (“An institution is a web of interrelated norms—formal and informal—governing
social relationships.”).
17. Stewart, supra note 6, at 111.
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themselves and of one another, what they believe to be important,
and what they strive to achieve.”18 Thus,
an institution guides and sustains individual identity in the same
way as a family, forming individuals by enabling or disabling
certain ways of behaving and relating to others, so that each
individual’s possibilities depend on the opportunities opened up
within the institution to which the person belongs.19

But inasmuch as human societies create and sustain social
institutions, a society can change its social institutions. “Institutions
can be changed in the sense that they will necessarily change if
sufficiently many individuals try to change them.”20 And because
social institutions are constituted by shared public meanings, they
are necessarily changed when those meanings are changed or no
longer sufficiently shared. Indeed, that is the only way a social
institution can be changed.
An individual may withdraw his deposit from a bank, or
break the law, or the rules [of] a game, without causing the
change or collapse of the institutions concerned. Such an action
would not be possible for all individuals acting as a collective
[without causing that change or collapse]. Conversely, there are
acts which are possible only for all individuals, but not for any
single individual. Changing, creating, maintaining or destroying
institutions are examples of this.21

Just as social institutions can be changed by alteration of the
constitutive shared public meanings, so they can be renewed and
strengthened by use consistent with those shared public meanings.
Whereas frequent use wears out most things—a car or a shirt, for

18. Id.
19. HELEN REECE, DIVORCING RESPONSIBLY 185 (2003).
20. EERIK LAGERSPETZ, THE OPPOSITE MIRRORS: AN ESSAY ON THE CONVENTIONALIST
THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS 28 (1995).
21. Eerik Lagerspetz, On the Existence of Institutions, in ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL REALITY 70, 82 (Eerik Lagerspetz et al. eds., 2001).
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example—frequent use actually renews and strengthens social
institutions.22 And just as social institutions can be changed or
reinforced, social institutions can be entirely dismantled when
members of the community fail to recognize or share their core
constitutive meanings.23
Society can use the law effectively to reinforce, to alter, or to
dismantle a social institution. This is because the law has an
expressive or educative function that is magnified by its authoritative
voice.24 And in actual practice, the law’s authoritative voice is used to
reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the shared public meanings that
constitute a social institution.25

22. SEARLE, supra note 15, at 57.
[A]s several social theorists have pointed out, institutions are not worn out by
continued use, but each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution.
Cars and shirts wear out as we use them but constant use renews and strengthens
institutions such as marriage, property, and universities. . . . [I]n terms of the continued
collective intentionality of the users, each use of the institution is a renewed expression
of the commitment of the users to the institution.
Id.
23. Id. at 117.
The secret of understanding the continued existence of institutional facts is simply
that the individuals directly involved and a sufficient number of members of the
relevant community must continue to recognize and accept the existence of such facts. .
. . The moment, for example, that all or most of the members of a society refuse to
acknowledge [the social institution of] property rights, as in a revolution or other
upheaval, property rights cease to exist in that society.
Id.
24. E.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 162 (1986) (“Supporting valuable forms
of life is a social rather than an individual matter. Monogamy, assuming that it is the only morally
valuable form of marriage, cannot be practised by an individual. It requires a culture which
recognizes it, and which supports it through the public’s attitude and through its formal
institutions.”); Gallagher, supra note 8, at 51 (“Laws do more than incentivize or punish …. They
educate directly and indirectly.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 69–71 (1996); Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para.
138 (S. Afr. Const. Ct Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/
uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT60-04) (“The law is . . . a great teacher [and] establishes public
norms . . . .”).
25. Regarding the reinforcing function, Joseph Raz observes:
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Use of the law to reinforce, alter, or extinguish the shared public
meanings that constitute a social institution is a political act. As
Edward Schiappa notes, “Definitions put into practice a special sort
of social knowledge—a shared understanding among people about
themselves, the objects of their world, and how they ought to use
language.”26 He continues:
If we look hard enough, all definitions serve some sort of
interests. . . . Defining what is or is not part of our shared reality
is a profoundly political act. The establishment of authoritative
definitions by law or custom requires a political process involving
persuasion or force that generates political results by advancing
some views and interests and not others.27

Schiappa’s reference to “a shared understanding among people
about . . . the objects of their world” illuminates the important
distinction between a social institution and the objects or
arrangements to which the institution relates most directly or
intimately. They are not the same, although casual thought may
mistake the latter for the former. A dollar bill is commonly referred
to as money, but it is not the social institution of money. Likewise, a

Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social institutions which enjoy
unanimous support in the community, in order to give them formal recognition, bring
legal and administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use by
members of the community who wish to do so, and encourage the transmission of belief
in their value to future generations. In many countries this is the significance of the
legal recognition of monogamous marriage and prohibition of polygamy.
RAZ, supra note 24, at 161.
26. EDWARD SCHIAPPA, DEFINING REALITY: DEFINITIONS AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING 3
(2003).
27. Id. at 69–70 (citation omitted). Kitzinger and Wilkinson apply the reality articulated by
Schiappa to the marriage context:
Marriage is a lynchpin of social organization: its laws and customs interface with
almost every sphere of social interaction. Its foundational role in defining structures of
social institution and citizenship means that definitional authority over what ‘counts’ as
marriage, and who is allowed access to it, has always been intensely political.
Celia Kitzinger & Sue Wilkinson, The Re-Branding of Marriage: Why We Got Married Instead of
Registering a Civil Partnership, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY 127, 132 (2004).
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wheat farm or a phosphate mine or a marshmallow factory, although
reflexively thought of in our society as private property, is not the
institution of private property. The dollar bill and the marshmallow
factory are only objects about which we may share understandings,
meanings, and norms—depending on the social institutions in our
particular society.
If the law affecting a social institution is “constitutional law,”
meaning the most fundamental law of the polity, the suppression of
old meanings and/or replacement with radically different meanings
operates across the entire public square. And it would seem that the
more totalitarian the government, the more extensive the public
square and therefore the more influential or even invasive the
constitutional law in whatever remains of the private. Here is an
example of “deinstitutionalization” by constitutional law; it is the
first Soviet constitution’s treatment of private property:
Pursuant to the socialization of land, private land ownership
is hereby abolished, and all land is proclaimed the property of the
entire people and turned over to the working people without any
redemption, on the principles of egalitarian land tenure. All
forests, mineral wealth and waters of national importance, as well
as all live and dead stock, model estates and agricultural
enterprises are proclaimed the property of the nation . . . [as well
as] the complete conversion of factories, mines, railways and
other means of production and transportation into the property
of the Soviet Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic.28

Finally, from these understandings of social institutions there
necessarily follows this: To alter a social institution by altering the
shared public meanings that constitute it is to also alter the
individual identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct formed by
reference to the old institution. The greater the alteration to the

28. KONSTITUTSIIA RSFSR (1918) [Konst. RSFSR] [RSFSR Constitution] art. 3, available at
http://www.politicsforum.org/documents/constitution_rsfsr_1918.php.
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institution, the greater the changes in the individual. Likewise, the
more influential the social institution changed, the greater the
changes in the individual.29
With these understandings, I return to the story of the Olympic
skaters and the brown loafers. Clearly, Barbara and Klara had
radically different relationships to and understandings of the same
pair of brown loafers. Barbara had been taught, formed, and
transformed by her society’s strong social institution of private
property, an institution reinforced by law and even enshrined in
American constitutional law,30 while Klara’s society had no
equivalent private property institution but rather another institution
that, in radically different ways, taught, formed, and transformed
individuals in relation to such things as marshmallow factories,
wheat farms, and shoes, with, again, Soviet law and constitution
reinforcing that different institution.31
The American private property institution formed an important
part of Barbara’s identity, or, more accurately, identities; she
understood herself to be an “owner” relative to some objects and “not
an owner” relative to other objects. Since her early childhood, the
institution taught her the complex web of meanings, relationships,
projects, and conducts comprising those two interrelated identities.
Likewise, the Soviet property institution had, equally effectively,
formed Klara’s identities and hence her conducts relative both to
various objects and to the various users of those objects. Except
perhaps in an abstract fashion, Barbara’s “property ways” were
incomprehensible to Klara and to Klara’s parents—but not to her

29. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 24, at 392.
30. E.g., U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV, § 1.
31. Not until 1977 was there any Soviet constitutional reference to something akin to
“private property.” Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] ch. II, art. 13.
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grandparents, for they would have been taught and formed by an
effective social institution of private property. The startled reaction
of the American athletes that day in that Olympic Village dorm room
evidences that they had a similar incomprehension of Klara’s
“property ways.”
On the foundation of these understandings from social
institutional studies, I now turn to the social institutional realities
pertaining to the legal definition of marriage. It is those institutional
realities that constitute the social institutional argument to preserve
man/woman marriage, and an antecedent understanding of that
argument is simply required to grasp adequately how the courts have
performed relative to it. So, although the story of how the courts
have handled the social institutional argument is extraordinarily
interesting, spinach before dessert.
C. Institutional Studies and the Legal Definition of Marriage
Almost universally, an important shared public meaning is that
marriage is the union of a man and a woman.32 Thus, that meaning
has been a constitutive core of the institution. That core meaning has
been and continues to be influential in forming individual identity,
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct in a way and to an extent that
common sense readily comprehends. Any word-picture of that
influence seems doomed to incompleteness, but here is Daniel Cere’s
concise effort:
[M]arriage is an institution that interacts with a unique socialsexual ecology in human life. It bridges the male-female divide. It
negotiates a stable partnership of life and property. It seeks to
manage the procreative process and to establish parental
obligations to offspring. It supports the birthright of children to
be connected to their mothers and fathers.
32. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 45–46.
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....
Michael Foucault contends that marriage has fostered a
particular type of human identity, namely, the “conjugal self.” Be
that as it may, marriage has always been the central cultural site
of male-female relations. A rich history and a complex heritage of
symbols, myths, theologies, traditions, poetry, and art have been
generated by the institution of marriage, which encodes a unique
set of aspirations into human culture along the axis of permanent
opposite-sex bonding and parent-child connectedness.33

As Cere’s description suggests, man/woman marriage is deemed
to provide well, and even uniquely, a number of social goods.
Neither claiming completeness nor suggesting any significance to the
order of appearance, the following subsection sets forth six of those
valuable social goods gleaned from the literature and particularly
relevant in the context of the current marriage debate. The six social
goods set forth are particularly relevant exactly because the
institution’s man/woman meaning plays at least a powerful and
usually an indispensable role in producing them.
1. Six Social Goods Provided by Man/Woman Marriage
First, the institution of man/woman marriage is quite certainly
society’s best and probably its only effective means to make
meaningful a child’s right to know and be brought up by his or her
biological parents (with exceptions being justified only in the best
interests of the child, not those of any adult).34 I take this to be what
Cere had in mind when he said: “[Man/woman marriage] supports
the birthright of children to be connected to their mothers and
fathers.”

33. Cere, supra note 9 at 11, 14 (footnote omitted).
34. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 9,
at 67.
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Second, the institution almost certainly qualifies as the most
effective means humankind has developed so far to maximize the
level of private welfare provided to the children conceived by
passionate, heterosexual coupling.35 Indeed, the provision of this
social good has been called “society’s deep logic of marriage.”36 Two
essential realities of man/woman intercourse are its procreative
power and its passion.37 Society’s interest relative to those realities is
in assuring the provision of adequate private welfare to children.38
Child-bearing in a setting of inadequate private welfare corrodes
societal interests while child-bearing in a setting of adequate private
welfare actually advances those interests.39
In passion-based
procreation, it is passion rather than rationality that may dictate the
Rationality considers
terms of the procreative encounter.40
consequences nine months hence, including the rearing of a child,
but passion does not.41 Confining procreative passion to a social
institution that will assure—to the largest practical extent—that
passion’s consequences (children) begin and continue life with
adequate private welfare is thus a fundamental and originating
purpose of marriage.42 The immediate beneficiaries of this private

35. Stewart, supra note 6, at 48.
36. Id at 44.
37. Regarding the prevalence of unintended pregnancy even in the contraceptive culture of
developed countries, see Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage
and Legal Justifications for the Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 447, 454–56 (2004).
38. As used here, the phrase private welfare includes not just the provision of physical needs
such as food, clothing, and shelter; it encompasses opportunities such as education, play, work,
and discipline and intangibles such as love, respect, and security.
39. Stewart, supra note 6, at 45.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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welfare purpose are the child and the often vulnerable mother, but
society rationally sees itself as the ultimate beneficiary.43
The third social good is related to the second. Man/woman
marriage is the irreplaceable foundation of the child-rearing mode—
that is, married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways
not subject to reasonable dispute)44 with the optimal outcomes
deemed crucial for a child’s—and hence society’s—well being. These
outcomes include physical, mental, and emotional health and
development; academic performance and levels of attainment; and
avoidance of crime and other forms of self- and other-destructive
behavior such as drug abuse and high-risk sexual conduct.45
Fourth, man/woman marriage serves as an effective bridge over
the male-female divide. “[M]arriage has always been the central
cultural site of male-female relations”46 and society’s primary and

43. Id. See also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003)
(Cordy, J., dissenting) (articulating these understandings particularly well).
44. As Justice Sosman said in her dissenting opinion in Goodridge:
[S]tudies to date reveal that there are still some observable differences between children
raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex couples. Interpretation
of the data gathered by those studies then becomes clouded by the personal and political
beliefs of the investigators, both as to whether the differences identified are positive or
negative, and as to the untested explanations of what might account for those
differences. (This is hardly the first time in history that the ostensible steel of the
scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense heat of political and
religious passions.) . . . [T]he most neutral and strict application of scientific principles
to this field would be constrained by the limited period of observation that has been
available. . . . The Legislature can rationally view the state of the scientific evidence as
unsettled on the critical question it now faces: Are families headed by same-sex parents
equally successful in rearing children from infancy to adulthood as families headed by
parents of opposite sexes?
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979–80 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Regarding married mother/father as the optimal child-rearing mode when compared with all
other adequately studied modes, see Maggie Gallagher and Joshua K. Baker, Do Moms and Dads
Matter? Evidence from the Social Sciences on Family Structure and the Best Interests of the Child, 4
MARGINS L. REV. 161 (2004) (collecting references to and summarizing the literature).
45. Stewart, supra note 6, at 64–70; Gallagher, supra note 8, at 50–51.
46. Cere, supra note 9, at 14.
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most effective means of bridging the male-female divide—that
“massive cultural effort of every human society at all times and in all
places.”47
Fifth, man/woman marriage is the only institution that can confer
the status of husband and wife, that can transform a male into a
husband or a female into a wife (a social identity quite different from
“partner”),48 and thus that can transform males into husband/fathers
(a category of males particularly beneficial to society)49 and females
into wife/mothers (likewise a socially beneficial category).50
Sixth, legally recognized and privileged man/woman marriage
constitutes both social and official endorsement of that form of adult
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may
rationally value above all other such forms. That rationality has been
demonstrated elsewhere,51 and to date there has been no counter to
that demonstration. Nor is there any sound basis for a constitutional
challenge to a societal judgment valuing and on that basis privileging
one form of adult intimacy above all others, although many
uncritically assume that Lawrence52 prohibits society from making
such a judgment. One or more of the many possible readings of
Lawrence may well prohibit government from burdening a particular
form of adult intimacy on no basis other than conventional morality,
but no responsible reading to date takes Lawrence so far as to
prohibit a government, acting on the basis of demonstrable

47. Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in DIVORCING
MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 43.
48. See, e.g., DeCoste, supra note 4, at 625–26.
49. See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 139–88 (1996).
50. See, e.g., Gallagher & Baker, supra note 44.
51. Stewart, supra note 6, at 52–57; Gallagher, supra note 37.
52. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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rationality, from most highly valuing and on that basis privileging
married heterosexual intercourse.
2. Why Genderless Marriage Cannot Deliver the Same Social
Goods
A social institution defined at its core as the union of any two
persons is unmistakably different from the historic marriage
institution between a man and a woman.53
Much has been and can be said about public meanings
influencing, [or] constituting, social institutions, which in turn
influence, even define, the human participants. All of that can be
said, of course, about both man/woman marriage as an institution
and genderless marriage as an institution. The point is the high
likelihood that an institution defined at its core as the union of a
man and a woman (with all that limitation implies and entails
regarding purposes and activities) will intend and sustain “the
social understandings, the practices, the goods, and the social
selves” in large measure not intended or sustained by an
institution defined at its core as any two persons in a close
personal relationship.54

The difference in constitutive meanings of necessity means that
what the new institution teaches relative to individual identity,
53. Observers of marriage who are both rigorous and well informed regarding the realities of
social institutions uniformly acknowledge the magnitude of these differences between the two
possible institutions of marriage. This is so regardless of the observer’s own sexual, political, or
theoretical orientation or preference. See, e.g., LADELLE MCWHORTER, BODIES AND PLEASURES:
FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION 125 (1999); RAZ, supra note 24, at 393;
Cere, supra note 9, at 11–18; Douglas Farrow, Canada’s Romantic Mistake, in DIVORCING
MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 1–5; Young & Nathanson, supra note 47, at 48–56; Gallagher, supra
note 8, at 53 (“Many thoughtful supporters of same-sex marriage recognize that some profound
shift in our whole understanding of the world is wrapped up in this legal re-engineering of the
meaning of marriage.”); Angela Bolt, Do Wedding Dresses Come in Lavender? The Prospects and
Implications of Same-Sex Marriage, 24 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 111, 114 (1998); Andrew
Sullivan, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 13, 15, 17–18 (1996); Nan D.
Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN &
GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 12–19 (1991); E.J. Graff, Retying the Knot, 262 THE NATION 12 (June 24,
1996) (“The right wing gets it: Same-sex marriage is a breathtakingly subversive idea. . . .
Marriage is an institution that towers on our social horizon, defining how we think about one
another . . . . [S]ame-sex marriage . . . announces that marriage has changed shape.”).
54. Stewart, supra note 6, at 77 (footnote omitted).
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perceptions, aspirations, and conduct is substantially different from
the formative instruction of the current institution of man/woman
marriage. That does not mean, of course, that there is no overlap in
formative instruction; the significance is in the divergence. One
important divergence centers on the normativeness of married
heterosexual relations and the normative exceptionality of all other
forms of intimate human conduct.55 Another centers on the relative
pre-eminence or subordination of the interests and desires of adults,
on one hand, and of the interests and needs of children, on the other
hand.56
That last point leads to a further evidence of the radical difference
between the two possible marriage institutions, and that is the
profound difference in social goods provided. For example, as noted
man/woman marriage makes meaningful a child’s right to know and
be reared by his or her biological parents (with exceptions being
justified only in the best interests of the child, not those of any adult),
hereafter referred to in shorthand as the child’s bonding right.
Governmental selection of genderless marriage in the place of
man/woman marriage, and especially a constitutional mandate for
such, further withdraws official recognition of the child’s bonding

55. See Gallagher, supra note 37, at 448–49 (quoting Martha A. Fineman, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230 (1995)).
56. See Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY Slip Op 09436 at *7 (N.Y. App.
Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (“Marriage laws are not primarily about adult needs for official recognition and
support, but about the well-being of children . . . .”), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm; Somerville, supra note 34, at 66–67, 78; Seana Sugrue,
“Marriage: Inside and Out” at 14–15 (2005) (paper presented at Illuminating Marriage
Conference, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, May 18-20 2005 (“Hence, same-sex marriage as well as
a number of other marital reforms, . . . foster the vulnerability of children to advance the desires
of adults.”); Jane Adolphe, “The Same-Sex Marriage Debate in Canada: Promoting Adults and
Ignoring Children,” (2005) (paper presented at the 12th World Conference of the International
Society of Family Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, July 19-23, 2005) abstract available at
http://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/Abstracts.pdf.
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right.57 It could not be otherwise for a core part of the argument for
genderless marriage is that same-sex couples have the power to bring
donor-conceived children into their family and that both the samesex couples and these donor-conceived children are entitled to the
benefits of civil marriage. In this way genderless marriage is not just
neutral towards the child’s bonding right but actually undercuts it,
while, in contrast, man/woman marriage has always provided
powerful institutional support to that right. Margaret Somerville
explains the radical difference, in this context, between the two
institutions:
[A]ccepting same-sex marriage necessarily means accepting that
the societal institution of marriage is intended primarily for the
benefit of the partners to the marriage, and only secondarily for
the children born into it. And it means abolishing the norm that
children—whatever their sexual orientation later proves to be—
have a prima facie right to know and be reared within their own
biological family by their mother and father. Carefully restricted,
governed, and justified exceptions to this norm, such as adoption,
are essential. But abolishing the norm would have a far-reaching
impact.58

Another example pertains to the bridge over the male/female
divide. The man/woman marriage institution ascribes a high value
to that endeavor and provides a host of supports for its
accomplishment. With a core meaning of “the union of any two
persons,” the genderless marriage institution quite simply does
neither. Moreover, as Camille Williams has shown, man/woman
marriage “is the only important social institution in which women

57. I say “further” because government allowance, albeit regulated, of anonymous donor
conception began the erosion of the child’s right. As explained in the text, recognition of
genderless marriage (especially as a constitutional mandate) would appear to render the right a
complete nullity.
58. Somerville, supra note 34, at 67.
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have always been necessary participants.”59 Displacement of that
institution “may result in future generations with a decreased ability
or desire for men and women to cooperate in families, and may
ultimately contribute to a new form of gender hierarchy and a new
variation of a sex-segregated society.”60
The reason is that
man/woman marriage produces, indeed is, “the norm for
cooperation between the sexes. While marriage patterns and
practices have varied across cultures and over time, marriage has
involved both sexes, and by doing so has set a pattern for cooperation
between the sexes.”61
The last example given here is the preparation for, conferral of,
and sustenance in the status of husband or wife, with there being no
need to belabor the large differences between the two possible
marriage institutions relative to that social good.62
This exercise is not meant to suggest that genderless marriage
may not provide unique and perhaps even valuable social goods.
Proponents of that institution have predicted that it will, and this
article takes up that issue later. The point is that man/woman
marriage and genderless marriage are radically different social

59. Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, at 1 (2005)
(paper presented at the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment Symposium, Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, Sep. 9, 2005) available at http://www.law2.byu.edu/marriage_family/
Sept9conference/draft%20papers/williams (soon to be published in the Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law.)
60. Id.
61. Id. at 9.
62. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 53.
One thing same-sex marriage indubitably does is displace certain formerly core
public understandings about marriage; such as, that it has something to do with
bringing together male and female, men with women, husbands and wives, mothers
with fathers. Husband will no longer point to or imply wife. Mother no longer implies
father.
Id.
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institutions as demonstrated by their wide divergence relative to
important social goods.
3. One or the Other: The Limit to One Marriage Institution
Governmental selection of genderless marriage has other
practical outcomes. For my purposes, perhaps the most important is
found at the intersection of the law’s authoritative role relative to
marriage’s meanings, and the unitary nature of the institution. By
unitary nature, I mean simply that society can sustain one and only
one marriage institution. Society cannot simultaneously tell people
(especially children) that marriage, in its core meaning, is the union
of any two persons and that marriage, in its core meaning, is the
union of a man and a woman. Given the role of language and
meaning in constituting and sustaining institutions, two “coexisting”
social institutions known society-wide as marriage amount to a
factual impossibility. Law’s authoritative role relative to marriage’s
meaning refers to this: Once the law (on constitutional grounds no
less) has taken a stand that the core meaning is the union of any two
persons, the law will then be unrelenting and thoroughgoing in
enforcement of that decision. The law’s own internal logic and
institutional mandates require no less. Thus, the intersection of the
unitary nature of marriage and the law’s authoritative role in
marriage’s meaning will result in the new meaning being mandated
in texts, in schools, and in virtually every other part of the public
square, and being voluntarily published by the media and other
institutions.63 Even linguistic, social, or religious enclaves dedicated
to preserving the old meaning will struggle,64 a matter I discuss at
more length later.

63. Stewart, supra note 6, at 111.
64. Helen Reece explains:
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One further comment on the unitary nature of the marriage
institution: Not uncommonly, people confronted with the marriage
debate think in terms of homosexual marriage, gay marriage or samesex marriage as a separate but co-existing marriage institution. That
uncritical thinking is no doubt due in part to the misleading power of
the very phrase same-sex marriage and its equivalents like
homosexual marriage. Those phrases are misleading because,
although the legal definition of civil marriage as the union of any two
persons allows same-sex couples to marry, it of course also allows a
woman and a man to marry. Everywhere the debate focuses on one
legally recognized relationship known as marriage, not two. The
phrase same-sex marriage and its equivalents thus convey the sense
(erroneously) of a legally recognized marriage separate or different
from the marriage of a man and a woman.65

When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who are
dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial norm
community. But this is not a complete solution because the social construction of
choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem unthinkable or may be too
costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it may also be merely reactive to
or even defined by the dominant norm community.
REECE, supra note 19, at 38.
65. Even people who should know better appear to fall into the analytical trap set by the
misleading terminology. James Q. Wilson recently said: “Since the Supreme Court struck down
laws against homosexual conduct many people have been preoccupied with either encouraging or
resisting homosexual marriage. Whatever your views about homosexual marriage, were it
adopted nationally it would affect only about 2 or 3 percent of the population.” James Q. Wilson,
The Ties That Do Not Bind: The Decline of Marriage and Loyalty, IN CHARACTER (Fall 2005),
available at http://www.incharacter.org/article.php?article=46.
The social institutional reality, of course, is that if “homosexual marriage” (meaning
genderless marriage, meaning marriage legally and even constitutionally defined as the union of
any two persons) were “adopted nationally[,] it would affect” not “2 or 3 percent of the
population” but every married couple and even those in our society not presently married. See
infra Part II.C.4–5. So, Homer nodded.

H 25 I

01__STEWART.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:33:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

4. Inclusion and Exclusion: Limits on and Effects of the Law’s
Power
Two other and related social institutional realities merit note.
First, same-sex couples cannot enter the institution of marriage as it
has existed to the present; in other words, it is not possible in reality
for same-sex couples to enter the privileged and vital civil institution
previously enjoyed only by opposite-sex couples. The very act of
legal redefinition will radically transform the old institution and
make it into a profoundly different institution, one whose meanings,
value, and vitality are speculative. Some same-sex couples look to the
law to let them into the privileged institution, and the law may want
to, but it cannot; it can only give them access to a different institution
of different value.66
The second reality applies to already married opposite-sex
couples. Redefinition and no act of their own removes them from
the institution they voluntarily entered (man/woman marriage) into
a markedly different one. To the extent that institutions are
constituted by social meaning, and to the extent that the law dictates
the social meaning of civil marriage, to redefine marriage as the
union of any two persons is not to pull gay men and lesbians into
marriage as our societies now know it but to pull married

66. Brian Bix, Reflections on the Nature of Marriage, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF
MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111, 112–13 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002).
Marriage is an existing social institution. One might also helpfully speak of it as an
existing “social good.” The complication in the analysis is that one cannot fully
distinguish the terms on which the good is available from the nature of the good. As
Joseph Raz wrote regarding same-sex marriage, “When people demand recognition of
gay marriages, they usually mean to demand access to an existing good. In fact they
also ask for the transformation of that good. For there can be no doubt that the
recognition of gay marriage will effect as great a transformation in the nature of
marriage as that from polygamous to monogamous or from arranged to unarranged
marriage.”
Id. (I would suggest a much greater transformation than that.)
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man/woman couples into what the media calls imprecisely “gay
marriage” and this article calls genderless marriage.67
5. Society’s Compelling Interests in Man/Woman Marriage
All these social institutional realities regarding marriage bring
into sharp focus the societal (and hence governmental) interests in
preserving marriage as the union of a man and a woman. For it is
that man/woman meaning, among the complex web of meanings
constituting the marriage institution, that uniquely and materially
provides the social goods described above and without which,
therefore, society would be deprived of those vital social goods. This
realization, illuminated by understandings of social institutions in
general and marriage in particular, renders much less consequential
the heated battle over the appropriate standard of judicial review of
constitutional challenges to the legal definition of marriage—whether
rational basis,68 rational basis with bite,69 intermediate,70 heightened
intermediate,71 or strict scrutiny.72 That is because society’s interests
in the perpetuation of those uniquely provided goods seem
compelling indeed and because what ostensibly73 is sought through

67. This reality has been understood since before the marriage issue drew public attention.
Adoption of genderless marriage “has fascinating potential for denaturalizing the gender structure
of marriage law for heterosexual couples. . . . [T]he impact [of genderless marriage], if such . . .
prevails, will be to dismantle the legal structure of gender in every marriage.” Nan D. Hunter,
supra note 53, at 16, 19 (emphasis added).
68. Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Com’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
70. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
71. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
72. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
73. I say “ostensibly” because of strong evidence that the movement to replace man/woman
marriage with genderless marriage sees that project not as an end in itself but rather as a means to
an essentially “nonmarriage” end. Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism and the Federal
Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 221, 256 nn.181–82 (2005); Stewart & Duncan,
supra note 9, at 556–58, 581–88; see also Sue Wise and Liz Stanley, Beyond Marriage: “The Less
Said About Love and Life-long Continuance Together the Better,” 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY
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this great contest—same-sex couple entry into that institution of
marriage highly esteemed for so very long now—is simply not
possible.
III
JUDICIAL ELISION OF THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
Regarding the phenomenon of judges eliding the social
institutional argument, an inquiry that aims to be helpful in the ongoing marriage debate in the United States must necessarily look not
just at domestic but also at Canadian and South African cases. That
is so for several interrelated reasons. Most significantly, despite
important differences in equality jurisprudence between the three
nations,74 certain fundamental concepts appear nearly universally in
the equality jurisprudence of polities with judicial review and
constitutional equality norms75—a category that includes Canada and
South Africa as well as the United States. One of the universals in the
equality equation is the weight of the societal interest advanced, or
thought to be advanced, by the impugned state action. The social
institutional argument aims to give a fair weight to the societal
interests implicated by the man/woman limitation in marriage. With
the judiciary of all three countries having experience with equalitybased demands for the redefinition of marriage,76 the social
institutional argument has been raised in all three countries—and
elided in all three countries. Furthermore, manners of elision that
332, 335 (2004), available at http://fap.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/14/2/332 (referencing the
gay/lesbian rights movement’s advocacy of genderless marriage; “This position acknowledges the
key, foundational properties of marriage as a social institution, for this is precisely why it is
thought it will lead to social equality.”) .
74. Stewart, supra note 6, at 28–31, 36–38, 100–19.
75. Id. at 27. The nearly universal concepts often carry different labels jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
76. See the cases discussed in the remainder of this Part.
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have yet to appear in courts in the United States are already apparent
in Canada and (perhaps) South Africa, providing a preview of
potential future judicial action and elision stateside. Consequently,
the foundation exists for a productive and even necessary
comparative law approach, and indeed a U.S.-centric approach
would seem to be doomed to inadequacy.
As of the first week of December 2005, a number of appellate
courts in the three countries had adjudicated claims to genderless
marriage. Of most interest here are the opinions issued by courts
that had before them at the time, at least in rudimentary form, the
social institutional argument and in some fashion considered the
institutional nature of marriage. I count six cases resulting in such
opinions: EGALE v. Attorney General (Canada)77 from the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in May 2003; Halpern v. Toronto (City)78
from the Ontario Court of Appeal in June 2003; Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health79 from the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in November 2003; Morrison v. Sadler80 from the
Indiana Court of Appeals in January 2005; Lewis v. Harris81 from
New Jersey’s Appellate Division in June 2005; and Minister of Home

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

[2003] 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472.
[2003] OJ No 2268, [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529.
798 N.E.2d 941. (Mass. 2003)
821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005).
875 A.2d 259. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
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Affairs v. Fourie82 from South Africa’s Constitutional Court in
December 2005.83
The question I want to address is how the judicial opinions
favoring genderless marriage handled the social institutional
argument. Those include EGALE’s three-judge decision mandating
genderless marriage; Halpern’s equivalent; Goodridge’s three-justice
plurality opinion; Lewis’s one-judge dissenting opinion; and the
Fourie decision, which, although not mandating the redefinition of
marriage, leaving the task of specifying changes in marriage and
family law to Parliament, nevertheless can be read under certain
approaches as “favoring” genderless marriage. For reasons that will
become clear, I am also interested in the opinion of the judge in
Pottle v. Attorney General (Canada)84 before the Supreme Court of
Newfoundland and Labrador, Trial Division, an opinion mandating
genderless marriage and one that qualifies as a “second-generation”
judicial handling of the social institutional argument.

82. CCT 60/04, slip op. (S. Afr. Const. Ct.
Dec. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT60-04).
The lower
appellate court hearing the South Africa marriage case apparently did not have before it in even
rudimentary form the social institutional argument, and that court’s opinion suggests no
awareness of the argument. Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2005 (3) BCLR 241 (SCA) (S.
Afr.).
83. Also in December 2005, New York’s Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department, issued Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY Slip Op 09436 (N.Y.
App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/
2005_09436.htm. The three-judge majority opinion and the one-judge concurring opinion, in
rejecting a state constitutional claim for genderless marriage, acknowledge rudimentary aspects of
the social institutional argument only to the extent that those two opinions, id. at *7, *23, cite and
quote from Justice Cordy’s articulation of the argument in Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995–96. The
one-judge dissenting opinion entirely ignores the social institutional argument, although that
argument engages most points attempted by the dissent.
84. See Transcript of Record, Pottle v. Attorney General (Canada), 2004 O1T 3964, available
at http://www.manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/Pottle_transcript.pdf.
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A. The Dissenting Opinion in Lewis
Perhaps the most startling judicial performance was the one
appearing in the dissenting opinion from New Jersey’s Lewis case. It
is startling exactly because the dissenting opinion assiduously refused
to acknowledge or even allude to the social institutional argument
when that argument was very much on the table. Both the majority
opinion and the concurring opinion addressed the social institutional
nature of marriage, and the concurring opinion sets out in fairly
complete fashion the social institutional argument. Thus, the
concurring opinion notes that marriage is a social institution
comprised by shared public meanings, that those meanings extend
beyond the constricted “close personal relationship” model of
marriage (which “strips the social institution ‘of any goal or end
beyond the intrinsic emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction
which the relationship brings to the individuals involved’”), that to
eliminate the core constitutive meaning of the union of a man and a
woman would be to render the institution “non-recognizable and
unable to perform its vital function” and would be to “seriously
compromise[], if not entirely destablize[] . . . the durability and
viability of this fundamental social institution,” that the law “‘has a
purpose and a power to preserve or change public meanings and thus
a purpose and a power to preserve or change social institutions,’” and
that “its opposite-sex feature makes it [the marriage institution]
meaningful and achieves important public purposes,” including the
public and rational privileging of heterosexual intercourse in
marriage and the advancement of marriage’s “private welfare”
purpose.85 Yet from the dissenting opinion not a word about the

85. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 275–78 (Parrillo, J., concurring).
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social institutional argument, not a word about what was certainly a
central pillar of the majority’s reasoning.
I do not suggest that a judge is somehow bound to address every
possible argument bearing on his decision. But I do suggest that
there is a hierarchy of sources of such arguments and that those
sources at the top can be ignored only at a price of judicial and
intellectual integrity. At the very top perhaps are arguments
(reasons, if you will) appearing in binding precedent. Near the top
would be reasons advanced in sources normally considered
persuasive and authoritative. And at least that high would be reasons
advanced by one’s judicial colleagues in the very same case, especially
if those reasons are material to the colleagues’ decision. In Lewis, the
social institutional argument was material to the decision of the
majority. Yet the dissenting opinion chose to not engage that
argument but rather to remain utterly silent regarding it, and in the
circumstances that was no doubt a deliberate decision. In these
respects, the judicial performance reflected in the Lewis dissenting
opinion must be adjudged disappointing, if not worse.86
B. EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge
These three 2003 cases mandating genderless marriage are
helpfully considered together. Despite the fact that EGALE and
Halpern are Canadian Charter cases and Goodridge addressed claims
based on the Massachusetts constitution, there is considerable
similarity of analytic strategy between the three across a number of

86. The three-judge plurality opinion and the one-judge concurring opinion in Goodridge
partake of this same deficiency. The dissenting opinion of Justice Cordy sets forth the social
institutional argument in considerable detail, see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995–97, but the
plurality opinion in large measure ignores it and the concurring opinion ignores it completely.
Perhaps those having enough votes to mandate a result are under less obligation to respond to the
arguments advanced by their colleagues who do not.
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issues,87 and that similarity is certainly present with respect to the
social institutional argument.88
The EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge courts all proceeded with a
full awareness of the social institutional nature of marriage. Indeed,
the plurality opinion in Goodridge begins: “Marriage is a vital social
institution.”89 The opinions in that case then go on to refer to
institution in the context of marriage over 80 times. The Halpern
decision has more than 40 such references; the decision in EGALE,
more than 35. The Halpern court had the benefit of a cogent
institutional argument from the Attorney General, which the court
summarized like this:
Changing the definition of marriage to incorporate
same-sex couples would profoundly change the very essence
of a fundamental societal institution. The AGC points to
no-fault divorce as an example of how changing one of the
essential features of marriage, its permanence, had the
unintended result of destabilizing the institution with
unexpectedly high divorce rates. This, it is said, has had a
destabilizing effect on the family, with adverse effects on
men, women and children. Tampering with another of the
core features, its opposite-sex nature, may also have
unexpected and unintended results. 90
The Goodridge majority had the benefit of Justice Cordy’s
detailed treatment of the social institutional argument in his
Moreover, the three courts repeatedly
dissenting opinion.91
acknowledged both the large change they were mandating in the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Stewart, supra note 6, at 41–99.
Id. at 75–85.
798 N.E.2d at 948.
225 D.LR. (4th) 529 at para. 133.
798 N.E.2d at 995–97.
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public meaning of marriage and the law’s strong “educative” or
“expressive” function in cases such as this.92
So the important question arises how these courts proceeded to
reach a conclusion that mandated genderless marriage.
The first of several answers to that question is that they used what
fairly may be called the “large change/no change” elision. As noted,
the three courts did acknowledge the large change the courts’
mandates would effect in the public meaning of marriage. EGALE
states that “the relief requested, if granted, would constitute a
profound change to the meaning of marriage, and would be viewed
as such by a significant portion of the Canadian public, whether or
not it supported the change.”93 The lower court in the Halpern case
expressed the same view,94 and the Goodridge plurality opinion
stated: “Certainly our decision today marks a significant change in
the definition of marriage as it has been inherited from the common
law, and understood by many societies for centuries.”95 But
juxtaposed with these assessments of “profound” and “significant”
change of meaning are assertions that the genderless marriage
decisions do not and will not change the institution of marriage.
Thus, the Goodridge plurality opinion says, immediately after the
sentence just quoted: “But it [the court’s decision] does not disturb
the fundamental value of marriage in our society.”96 And EGALE
and Halpern, with their adoption of the no-downside argument,
manifest a similar view. As just noted, in Halpern the Attorney
General argued that “[c]hanging the definition of marriage to

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Stewart, supra note 6, at 77–80 (collecting citations and quotes from the three cases).
2003 BCCA 251 at para. 78.
[2002] OJ 2714, 215 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (Ont. Civ. Ct.) at paras. 97–98.
798 N.E.2d at 965.
Id.
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incorporate same-sex couples would profoundly change the very
essence of a fundamental societal institution,”97 but the court rejected
this as “speculative.”98
These judicial assertions of “no change” in the institution of
marriage, in light of the acknowledged “profound” and “significant”
change in the public meaning of marriage, are flatly contradicted by
social institutional realities. Social institutions are constituted by—
are nothing other than, if you will—shared public meanings. To
change those meanings is to change the institution, including the
quantity and quality of its social goods. To change those meanings
radically is to deinstitutionalize the old institution (and thereby lose
its social goods) and to replace it with a new one.
And the argument advanced by Halpern and Goodridge to
buttress the “no change” assertion is itself contradicted by social
institutional realities. The Goodridge plurality opinion presents as
proof of “no change” the intentions of the same-sex couples then
before the court: “Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to
undermine the institution of civil marriage,”99 and: “That same-sex
couples are willing to [enter civil marriage] . . . is a testament to the
enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.”100
Halpern takes the same tack: “The Couples are not seeking to abolish
the institution of marriage; they are seeking access to it.”101 Yet the
probative value of such intentions and willingness is not at all
apparent; it seems nonsensical that the intentions of a handful of
people could insulate a vast social institution constituted by its public

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at para. 133.
Id. at para. 134.
798 N.E.2d at 965.
Id.
225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at para. 129.
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meanings from change resulting from a profound alteration in those
meanings. The social reality is that the intentions and conduct of an
individual or even a small group of individuals can neither prevent
nor effect institutional change. This bears repeating: “[T]here are
acts which are possible only for all individuals, but not for any single
individual. Changing, creating, maintaining or destroying
institutions are examples of this.”102
The second answer to the key question of how these three courts
handled the social institutional argument is that they used what fairly
may be called the “selectively impotent law” elision. Again as noted,
the three courts acknowledged the law’s strong “educative,” or
“expressive,” function and, indeed, make that function a lynchpin of
many arguments. For example, the Goodridge plurality opinion
speaks of an unchanged definition giving a “stamp of approval” to
stereotypes.103 And Halpern repeatedly speaks of the definition of
man/woman marriage “perpetuating” “views” about the capacities of
same-sex couples.104 Yet the acknowledged educative function of law
seems to reinforce the lessons of social institutional studies regarding
civil institutions as webs of significance; law has a purpose and a
power to preserve or change public meanings and thus a purpose and
a power to preserve or change social institutions. More directly to
the present context, the social institution of marriage is not at all
immune, but rather is open, to fundamental change resulting from a
profound change in the law’s definition of marriage. The three cases
manifest a quick readiness to acknowledge law’s educative and hence
society-changing power when some preferred value is being
advanced, while manifesting a stubborn refusal to acknowledge that
102. Lagerspetz, supra note 21, at 82.
103. 798 N.E.2d at 962.
104. E.g., 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529.at para. 94.
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same power when its use places the goods of man/woman marriage
at risk. Yet the law is not both potent and impotent in the very same
endeavor.105
It may or may not be a proper judicial role to weigh the societal
costs against the societal benefits flowing from a profound change in
the public meanings of marriage (a question addressed later), but the
three cases’ fundamental inconsistency of approach to benefits and
costs cannot qualify as a defensible judicial performance.
The Goodridge plurality opinion contains another elision, one
unique to itself. The Commonwealth had pled for the preservation
of man/woman marriage by pointing to one of its valuable social
goods: man/woman marriage provides for that child-rearing mode—
married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways not
subject to reasonable dispute)106 with the optimal outcomes deemed
crucial for a child’s (and hence society’s) well being. The plurality
opinion studiously avoided taking issue with the reality of that social
good. What it did rather was shift the asserted State interest from
protecting the optimal child-rearing mode (man/woman marriage)
to “[p]rotecting the welfare of children,”107 and, on that shifted basis,
argued that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not
promote the present welfare of all children, is contrary to the
Commonwealth’s policy and practice of helping children whatever
their family situation, and “penalize[s] children by depriving them of

105. For a strong rejection of the “impotent law” argument by a leading scholar on historical
and contemporary marriage in America, see Nancy F. Cott, The Power of Government in
Marriage, 11 THE GOOD SOCIETY 88 (2002).
106. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979–80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 962 (majority opinion).
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State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents’ sexual
orientation.”108
This analysis is valid only to the extent that protecting the
optimal child-rearing mode (man/woman marriage) is the same
governmental endeavor as “protecting the welfare of children” (as the
plurality opinion uses that phrase). But this is not at all clear.
Reflection suggests that the two endeavors are substantially different.
Protecting the present welfare of individual children found in
varying circumstances is, in the way the plurality opinion addresses
it, the provision of public assistance of some form or another to
individuals (or their care-takers). By contrast, protecting the optimal
child-rearing mode (man/woman marriage) entails the protection,
sustenance, and perpetuation of a social institution.
Thus
understood, the two different governmental protective endeavors are
just that, different. The plurality opinion disappoints in that it
provides no demonstration of the equivalency or overlap of the two
endeavors and thus provides no justification for its shift from one to
the other. Nor does the difference the plurality opinion ignores seem
much diminished by the common notion of “child welfare” even
broadly conceived; that is because the endeavor to protect the
optimal child-rearing mode, with its institutional focus, looks
primarily to improve the private welfare received by future
generations, whereas the personalized protective endeavor made the
basis of the plurality opinion’s argument is an exercise in the present
provision of public welfare.
Simply put then, the Goodridge plurality opinion never honestly
came to grips with important social institutional realities relative to

108. Id. at 962–64.
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man/woman marriage, because it chose yet again to elide those
realities.
Finally, there is an elision unique to Halpern. With respect to the
Attorney General’s institutional argument, the Halpern court insisted
that the government must prove with “cogent evidence” that the
redefinition of marriage would in the future result in any loss of
valuable social goods or otherwise lead to societal harm. Ignoring
the teachings of social institutional studies in general and the power
of the Attorney General’s specific demonstration—the no-fault
divorce “reform” battered permanence as a core constitutive
meaning of the marriage institution, resulting in a great upsurge in
divorce with all that development’s accompanying and now welldocumented societal harm—the Halpern court labelled any evidence
of adverse consequences from legal redefinition as “speculative.”109 It
did this without acknowledging the obvious reason no historical (as
opposed to “speculative”) evidence exists in the genderless marriage
context; genderless marriage is a new experiment, and it is the very
pace of the genderless marriage advocates’ march that leaves
“unprovable” with historic evidence the experiment’s outcomes. As
to the uncontroversial teachings of social institutional studies and
their illumination of the consequences of institutional exchange, the
court was silent.
C. The Trial Court’s Decision in Newfoundland’s Pottle Case
The Pottle decision110 merits examination because it is a “second
generation” case; the judge knew of the defects in Goodridge, Halpern
and EGALE pointed out above but, apparently believing that he

109. 225 DLR (4th) 529 at para. 134.
110. Transcript, supra note 84.
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ought to reach the same result, nevertheless made an effort toward an
original harmonizing of social institutional realities with the
genderless marriage project. He failed, in ways that are instructive.
A person not trained in the law but representing himself, Pastor
Gordon Young, sought to intervene in Pottle so as to provide a voice
in favor of preserving man/woman marriage, and the court allowed a
limited intervention.111 With a remarkable grasp of the social
institutional realities, Pastor Young presented them in oral argument
and added this original metaphor (which becomes important in
understanding the court’s decision): “If you have an orange and an
apple side-by-side and scoop out the inside of the orange and replace
it with the apple, you will end up with something that looks like an
orange on the outside, but in fact its fundamental essence will have
been changed. The metaphor, of course, aims to teach the different
natures of man/woman marriage and genderless marriage.”112
Immediately after Pastor Young had used the metaphor, the trial
judge responded in words that merit full quote:
The metaphor you used, scooping out the orange and putting an
apple inside, and therefore changing the fundamental character,
is an intriguing one. I think what you were saying is that if you
allow same-sex couples to, if you will, come under the umbrella
of marriage, to do so you have to strip away some of the
characteristics or the incidents of marriage, as they have been
traditionally understood. Whilst that may be true, when you’re
looking at marriage as a cultural or a social institution, in so far as
individuals are concerned, does it affect an opposite-sex couple
who want to marry and who want to have a marriage
relationship, if you will, in a traditional form, who subscribe to
the values of . . . the cooperation between the sexes, procreation,
and the provision of a mother and father. Would not an
expanded definition of marriage still allow those who subscribe to
111. Id. at 61.
112. Id. at 190–91.
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the traditional notions of marriage, still to have a marriage
relationship that involves those characteristics and those
values?113

To which question Pastor Young replied that the new definition
would not result in “the old institution enhanced” but would result in
the “whole institution [being] changed radically” exactly because
“such profound characteristics are omitted from the existing
institution.”114
But the trial judge apparently did not want to leave the analytical
work there. He went on to say, again in words that merit full
quotation:
People choose to enter the state of matrimony for all sorts of
reasons, and with varying intentions as to how that relationship
will develop and be conducted thereafter. Those who believe that
marriage is for promoting procreation and ensuring that children
will have an opportunity for influence by both genders in their
development, may continue to do so. In that sense, for them, the
core of the orange has not changed. On the other hand, those
who wish other benefits of marriage . . . may want to avail of the
relationship of marriage for those other characteristics that are
associated with it.115

He then asserted that the fundamental differences between the
genderless marriage institution and the man/woman marriage
institution “should not, in principle, matter.”116 With that, the trial
judge finally concluded that he preferred “not the metaphor of the
apple inside the orange, but one instead of the apple and the orange
co-existing side-by-side, under the umbrella of equality.”117

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
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The trial court’s analysis, I suggest, does not adequately come to
grips with at least four social institutional realities. The first elision is
a common one in the popular debate, a shift from the macro to the
micro. Genderless marriage proponents often deploy the language of
autonomous individuality. By that, I mean a discourse focused solely
on individuals qua individuals, or couples qua couples, with no
reference to their social context or to institutional realities. An
example of this is actually an effective political tactic deployed by
genderless marriage proponents. The tactic is to ask, “How can
letting me and my [same-sex] partner marry in any way hurt your
marriage?” Or, “How is Jim and John marrying going to have any
effect on yours and your husband’s relationship?” By its very
language, this question forces the issue into the micro framework,
that is, it requires that the marriage issue be decided on the basis of
benefits and harms to specific individuals or couples, as in “me and
my partner” or “you and your husband.” And by that same language,
the question precludes consideration of the marriage issue in the
macro framework, that is, the framework provided by social
institutional studies. Moreover, it is precisely because of this
“forcing” mechanism that the question is so often an effective
political tactic. After all, not many lay people (besides the rare Pastor
Young) are prepared to respond by saying, “Well, if Jim and John
marry, that means that our society will have changed a core
constitutive meaning of the vital social institution of marriage from
the union of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons.
With that radical change, the old institution will disappear and
therefore, necessarily, its invaluable social goods will disappear.
Those social goods have meant a great deal to my forebears and their
society and to me and my society and I want my posterity to have
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those social goods down through their generations, because I don’t
think they can have a good society without them.”
Nor, it seems to me, can the macro-to-micro shift be justified by
the assertion that the constitutional rights at play, whether of equality
or liberty, are individual rights and that therefore the legal analysis
must operate at the micro level. Although the relevant equality and
liberty rights are indeed individual (or personal) rights, the social
institutional argument is not advanced to counter abstract notions of
equality, liberty, or dignity but rather to give a clear understanding of
the scope and power of the societal (and hence governmental)
interests at stake in the decision to preserve or jettison the social
institution of man/woman marriage. That understanding matters
very much—unless a court is prepared to hold that genderless
marriage is an imperative of some absolute right, whether of equality
or liberty.
At some point any rational equality or liberty
jurisprudence must, to retain its rationality, give important societal
interests their due. The equality and liberty jurisprudence of the
federal judiciary and of each state judiciary do that.118 Certainly a
118. It is less certain that Canadian and South African equality jurisprudence give important
societal interests their due. Canadian equality jurisprudence requires analysis through two steps.
The first step, or Section 15 analysis, determines, without any regard to societal interests, whether
the impugned government action distinguishes between a rightholder and others and thereby
burdens the former’s sense of dignity in a way that, through the eyes of the rightholder but with a
bit of objective perception thrown in, is just not right. If so, that is discrimination. E.g., Law v.
Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at paras. 21–88. The
second step, or Section 1 analysis, determines whether the government can meet a heavy burden
of justifying that discrimination; it is “the government’s burden under s. 1 . . . to justify a breach of
human dignity [i.e., to justify a judicially determined ‘discrimination’ made without any regard to
societal interests].” Halpern, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at para. 92 (relying on Lavoie v. Canada, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 769, at paras. 809–10). But that analysis must again measure and give full weight to the
rightholder’s affected interests and self-perceived wounded dignity. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529
at para. 119. In other words, when at last the societal interests are allowed onto the radar screen,
they must be viewed through a particular filter, the filter of that already determined “breach of
human dignity.” South African equality jurisprudence requires a not dissimilar approach, see
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1
(CC), and indeed is responsive to developments in Canadian equality jurisprudence. E.g.,
President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), at para. 41.
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rational constitutional jurisprudence requires, even demands, a cleareyed understanding and fair measurement of the societal interests at
stake in each case invoking personal constitutional rights, and, in the
marriage cases, that is what the social institutional argument
provides. The macro-to-micro shift is a mechanism to obscure that
understanding and thereby preclude that fair measurement.
The Pottle trial judge rather expressly made the shift from macro
to micro. “Whilst that [the macro social institutional argument] may
be true, when you’re looking at marriage as a cultural or a social
institution, [shift to micro] in so far as individuals are concerned,
does it affect an opposite-sex couple who want to marry and who
want to have a marriage relationship . . . .”119 This macro-to-micro
shift elides, of course, the fundamental understanding that marriage
is a social institution and that marriage therefore cannot be rationally
or intelligently considered politically (in the broadest sense of the
word) except on the basis of that understanding. The trial court
could not get to where it seemingly wanted to go on the basis of that
understanding; the court therefore simply shifted the discourse away
from that macro understanding to the micro world of autonomous
individuality. Confronted with the macro understanding, the trial
court could not rationally deny the profound societal effects of the
redefinition of marriage, but by shifting to the micro perspective, the
court could comfortably ignore them.
The Pottle trial judge also appears to have slipped into an elision
present in Halpern and Goodridge and discussed above, an avoidance
of the reality that an individual or even small groups of individuals,
by their life choices and conduct, can neither sustain nor alter nor
unmake a vast social institution. A common and further component

119. Transcript, supra note 84, at 194.
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of this elision is the notion that ubiquitous variety in individuals’
marriage customs, perceptions, and conduct somehow means that
the whole institution is up for grabs. That the judge was laboring
under this notion is suggested by this language from the bench:
“People choose to enter the state of matrimony for all sorts of
reasons, and with varying intentions as to how that relationship will
develop and be conducted thereafter.”120 Yet this notion elides the
virtually universal reality that a shared core and constitutive meaning
of marriage is the union of a man and a woman.121 Although it is
true that in our society the constitutive meanings of the marriage
institution do not include a bride in a white wedding gown or a stayat-home wife, those meanings most certainly include a bride and a
groom, a wife and a husband. And of course it is that core meaning
of the union of a man and a woman that must go in order for, in the
judge’s words, “those [that is, same-sex couples] who wish other
benefits of marriage . . . to avail of the relationship of marriage . . .
.”122 And that is a reality the trial court evaded.
The Pottle court’s “umbrella” metaphor, created as a counter to
Pastor Young’s “altered orange” metaphor, operates as the court’s
third elision of social institutional realities. Recall what the court
said: “So I prefer, therefore, not the metaphor of the apple inside the
orange, but one instead of the apple and the orange co-existing sideby-side, under the umbrella of equality.”123

120. Id. at 208.
121. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 45 (“Marriage is a virtually universal social institution. . . .
[E]verywhere marriage has something to do with bringing together a man and a woman into a
public—not merely private—sexual union, in which the rights and responsibilities of the husband
and wife towards each other and any children their sexual union produces are publicly—not
privately—defined and enforced.”).
122. Transcript, supra note 83, at 208.
123. Id.
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This is an argument that society can indeed sustain at the same
time two social institutions authoritatively called marriage but
radically different in their core constitutive meanings. This is an
argument that society, at one and the same time, can teach the people
(especially the children) that marriage means the union of a man and
a woman and that marriage means the union of any two persons.
But of course society cannot do that; it is nonsensical to say that it
can. This notion of two co-existing “arrangements” makes sense
only if the court had in mind the de-institutionalization of marriage,
for a society is capable of accommodating a number of alternative
lifestyles. But it seems clear that the court had no such thing in
mind. It began its decision by saying: “If there’s one thing that
everybody agrees on, in this courtroom and in our society today, I
think is that marriage is a fundamental social institution.”124 Nor did
the court’s language anywhere suggest that it intended the loss of
marriage’s social goods, something that must happen when the
institution providing those goods is deinstitutionalized. No, the
thinking reflected in the “umbrella” metaphor is nothing other than
an elision of uncontroversial social institutional realities.
The Pottle court’s fourth elision is seen in its adoption of the
“enclave” argument. The enclave argument holds that those in our
society who do not agree with the teachings and formative influences
of the genderless marriage institution and the interests genderless
marriage advances can simply retreat to an enclave, whether it be a
linguistic, social, and/or religious enclave. In their own enclave, such
persons would be free to do their own marriage thing unaffected by
the new social institution. The judge initially put the argument in
these words:

124. Id. at 203.

H 46 I

01__STEWART.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:33:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

Whilst that may be true, when you’re looking at marriage as a
cultural or a social institution, in so far as individuals are
concerned, does it affect an opposite-sex couple who want to
marry and who want to have a marriage relationship, if you will,
in a traditional form, who subscribe to the values of . . . the
cooperation between the sexes, procreation, and the provision of
a mother and father. Would not an expanded definition of
marriage still allow those who subscribe to the traditional notions
of marriage, still to have a marriage relationship that involves
those characteristics and those values?125

He reemphasized the enclave argument with these words: “Those
who believe that marriage is for promoting procreation and ensuring
that children will have an opportunity for influence by both genders
in their development, may continue to do so. In that sense, for them,
the core of the orange has not changed.”126
As I have noted elsewhere,127 there are problems with the notion
that resourceful people could still find ways to communicate to the
next generations of children the unique goods of man/woman
marriage and its value. Certainly some might; by private educational
endeavor it is possible for families or other groups to establish a sort
of linguistic enclave in the heart of a community that has no
comprehension of what matters to them. But to the degree that
members of the enclave were to adopt the speech of the community,
they would lose the power to name and, in large part, the power to
discern what once mattered to their forbears. To that degree, their
forbears’ ways would seem implausible to them, and probably even
unintelligible. (This was Klara’s experience relative to the social

125. Id. at 194–95.
126. Id. at 208.
127. Stewart, supra note 6, at 82–83.
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institution of private property.) The bare possibility that people
could, with considerable difficulty and sacrifice, maintain the
meanings for their children of man/woman marriage is therefore just
that—a bare possibility.
The possibility becomes even less substantial upon realization
that
[t]o change the core meaning of marriage from the union of a
man and a woman . . . to the union of any two persons [will result
in] . . . the new meaning [being] mandated in texts, in schools,
and in many other parts of the public square and voluntarily
published by the media and other institutions, with society,
especially its children, thereby losing the ability to discern the
meanings of the old institution.128

I therefore think this picture to be misleading: the State of (fill in
the blank: Massachusetts, California, etc.) as the happy home of
many different marriage norm communities, each doing its own
marriage thing, each equally valid before the law, each equally secure
in its own space. There is reason to believe that the genuinely realistic
picture as a matter of legal and social fact is far different: The state
mandates by force of polity-wide law one and only one marriage
institution and one and only one marriage norm, and that is
genderless marriage. After all, the advocates of genderless marriage
are not taking the position that the law should get out of the marriage
business and leave the definition of marriage to private action or

128. Id. at 111. Helen Reece’s observation merits repetition here:
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who are
dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial norm
community. But this is not a complete solution because the social construction of
choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem unthinkable or may be too
costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it may also be merely reactive to
or even defined by the dominant norm community.
REECE, supra note 19, at 38.
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private enclaves. Quite the contrary, they are insisting that
constitutional doctrine compels (or public policy makes wise) the
polity-wide adoption of the genderless marriage institution.
Consequently, the genderless marriage norm will be mandated in
and reinforced by texts, mandated in and reinforced by schools, and
mandated in and reinforced by many other parts of the public square
and, furthermore, will be voluntarily published by the media and
other institutions. One marriage norm community will be officially
sanctioned and protected; all other marriage norm communities will
be officially constrained, will be officially disdained and sharply
curtailed.129
To say otherwise is to say that the law, as an institution itself,
would not be subject to strong institutional mandates—some
sounding in logic and consistency, some in more elementary
considerations—to be persistent and thoroughgoing in enforcing its
newly declared “constitutional” norm. In the same vein, to say
otherwise is to say that the law is impotent to reinforce, to alter, or to
dismantle social institutions, and no rational, informed person says
that.

129. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 67 (“If same-sex marriage is a right, powerful legal pressures
will be brought to bear on religions and other organizations that fail to acknowledge this right.
The capacity of schools and faith communities to transmit the marriage idea to the next
generation will be sharply curtailed. People who believe that children need mothers and fathers
will be treated like bigots in the public square.”); see also Douglas Farrow, Rights and Recognition,
in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 101–02 (“The preamble to this draft legislation [the
Chrétien government’s proposed genderless marriage bill of 2003] indicates that redefining
marriage to make it accessible to same-sex couples will ‘reflect values of tolerance, respect and
equality’ consistent with the Charter. But of course it follows that those who oppose redefinition
do not reflect such values. This charge, publicly made and enshrined in law, can only diminish the
respect in which such people are held . . . .”); Darrel Reid & Janet Epp Buckingham, Whose Rights?
Whose Freedoms?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 9, at 84 (“The fact is that millions of
Canadians who are opposed to same-sex marriage have now been told by the courts that their
view on marriage is contrary to the Charter and, by extension, un-Canadian.”).
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In all these ways, the Pottle trial court’s efforts to harmonize the
genderless marriage project with social institutional realities must be
adjudged inadequate.
D. The Constitutional Court’s Decision in South Africa’s Fourie
Case
Before the Constitutional Court, the South African government
presented its interests in preserving man/woman marriage by
referencing the social institutional argument. The court’s opinion
expressly mentioned that argument twice, once in the “Justification”
section130 and once in the “Remedy” section.131
In the former section, a less than careful reading of the opinion’s
key paragraph may lead to the belief that the court rejected the social
institutional argument.132 The key language is this: “Granting access
to same-sex couples would in no way attenuate the capacity of
heterosexual couples to marry in the form they wished and according
to the tenets of their religion.” But this assertion may or may not
constitute a rejection (by elision) of the social institutional argument.
It does not if what same-sex couples are granted “access” to is a legal
arrangement that does not operate to redefine marriage, and the
court may well have been contemplating such a possibility because
the immediately preceding sentence speaks of “enabling same-sex
couples to enjoy the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities
that marriage law affords to heterosexual couples.”133 If the court
were contemplating the redefinition of marriage as the only possible

130. Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at paras. 110–11 (S. Afr. Const.
Ct. Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/JCCT60-04.
131. Id. at para. 123.
132. Id. at para. 111.
133. Id.
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outcome to its equality analysis, that language would almost certainly
have been instead the more concise, direct “enabling same-sex
couples to marry.” Thus, it would seem that the key to what the
court was contemplating in this regard is to be found in the opinion’s
“Remedy” section, and a few paragraphs later I examine that section
to see what light it sheds on the question of the court’s intent relative
to the deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage.
But returning to the “granting access” sentence, that language
does constitute a rejection (by elision) of the social institutional
argument if the opinion is mandating the redefinition of marriage
prerequisite to same-sex couples having “access” to marriage. Under
this reading, the opinion is not an engagement with the social
institutional argument but an elision of it; the bald assertion, the ipse
dixit, that the redefinition of marriage “would in no way attenuate
the capacity of heterosexual couples to marry in the form they wished
and according to the tenets of their religion” is without question a
macro to micro shift because (under this reading), by speaking of
heterosexual couples qua heterosexual couples and only in that way,
the opinion is evading social context and thus social institutional
realities.
Under this reading, the opinion must further be seen as adopting
the discredited “no-downside” argument.134 The classic statement of
that argument goes something like this: “[R]ecognizing same-sex
unions will not be likely to deter any heterosexual person from
marrying or having children.”135 This language suggests, and no

134. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 35–36, 71–85.
135. Bala, supra note 4, at 21; see also Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY
Slip Op 09436, at *36 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (Saxe, J.P., dissenting), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm. (“[I]t is not apparent how
allowing same-sex couples to marry will have any effect on the continued survival of the
[marriage] institution itself, or even its ongoing vitality among heterosexuals.”).
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doubt intends to, that all the goods of man/woman marriage will still
be available post-redefinition because men and women will continue
to marry each other at an undiminished rate. But this suggestion
misses the point. The point is what the straight men and women will
be marrying “into.” They will be marrying into a much different
social institution than their parents married into simply because,
undeniably, a constitutive core meaning will be radically different.
And it is not state-sanctioned opposite-sex coupling that produces
the old institution’s social goods; it is the old institution’s meanings
that do that. So with the loss of those meanings comes the loss of the
social goods and thus the collapse of the “no-downside” argument.
This realization of what opposite-sex couples will be marrying
into illuminates a further inadequacy of the “no-downside”
argument. Social institutions are renewed and strengthened by use
consistent with the shared public meanings constituting them.
“[E]ach use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that
institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we use them but constant use
renews and strengthens institutions such as marriage. . . .”136 After
redefinition, every use of the new institution by a man/woman
couple will validate and reinforce it; after all, that couple will be
invoking on their union the sanctioning power of a polity that
rigorously views their union as one between “two persons.” Because
those “two persons” happen to be a man and a woman, the
consequences may initially be misunderstood by many or even most,
but the strengthening effect on the new institution is largely
unavoidable.137 Thus the argument—“just as many straight men and
136. SEARLE, supra note 15, at 57.
137. I say “largely” because, as things now stand in Canada and Massachusetts, a man and a
woman desiring to avoid complicity with the new institutional regime could fulfill that desire—
but only by openly participating in a decidedly exclusive marriage ceremony sanctioned only by a
decidedly exclusive norm community (in other words, by openly foregoing civilly sanctioned
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women will marry”—actually cuts against, not in favor of, genderless
marriage once the social institutional realities are given their due.
Regarding the two possible readings of the Fourie opinion’s
treatment of the social institutional argument in its “Justification”
section, I believe that the more accurate reading clears the court of
suspicion that it both elided that argument with the macro to micro
shift and adopted the discredited “no-downside” argument. Analysis
of the “Remedy” section provides strong support for that belief, and
that analysis follows.
The Fourie opinion’s “Remedy” section, in a lengthy discussion,138
never mandates the redefinition of marriage, does reject the urgings
of one member of the court139 and of the plaintiff parties
(applicants)140 that the court do so now, and expressly gives
Parliament, for at least one year,141 “a free hand . . . within the
framework established”142 by the opinion to fashion a legislative
scheme that brings same-sex couples “in from the legal cold.”143
Regarding “the framework established” by the opinion, the court
repeatedly makes clear that Parliament’s arrangement need not be a
redefinition of marriage. Thus:

genderless marriage by means of a consciously political act). The price for doing so includes
forfeiting the benefits of civil marriage and being officially labeled as bigoted (or at least
“discriminatory”)—that is, as hostile to the constitutional ideal of equality. Interestingly, Fourie
summarizes a South African Law Reform Commission proposal that would allow for heterosexual
couples as a matter of “personal choice” to opt for “opposite-sex specific marriages,” legally
existing parallel to a genderless marriage regime, without forfeiting the benefits of civil marriage.
Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 143–46.
138. Id. at paras. 115–55.
139. Id. at paras. 163–73 (O’Regan, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. E.g., id. at para. 123.
141. Id. at paras. 156–61.
142. Id. at para. 155.
143. Id. at para. 138.
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The simple textual change pleaded for by the Equality Project
[redefining marriage] and the comprehensive legislative project
being finalised by the [South Africa Law Reform Commission,
creating parallel man/woman marriage and genderless marriage
legal regimes], do not, however, necessarily exhaust the legislative
paths which could be followed to correct the defect.144

More:
Thus a legislative intervention which had the effect of enabling
same-sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements and
responsibilities that heterosexual couples achieve through
marriage, would without more override any discriminatory
impact flowing from the common law [man/woman] definition
standing on its own. . . . The effect would be that formal
registration of same-sex unions [note “unions,” not “marriages”]
would automatically extend the common law and statutory legal
consequences to same-sex couples that flow to heterosexual
couples from marriage.145

As a final example, the opinion speaks of “leaving Parliament
free, if it chose, to amend the law so as to provide an alternative
statutory mechanism to enable same-sex couples to enjoy their
constitutional rights . . . .”146
144. Id. at para. 147.
145. Id. at para. 122.
146. Id. at para. 135 (emphasis added). In considering what South African constitutional
norms require for same-sex couples (as opposed to allow), in at least sixteen instances the Fourie
opinion uses careful language that stops short (no doubt consciously) of requiring that marriage
be redefined as the union of any two persons. Id. at paras. 44 (“Are gay and lesbian people
unfairly discriminated against because they are prevented [not from marrying but] from
achieving the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities which heterosexual couples acquire
from marriage?”); 62 (speaking of “the consequences of total exclusion of same-sex couples from
[not marriage but] the solemnities and consequences of marriage”); 71 (after a long description of
the incidents of civil marriage, stating that the “exclusion of same-sex couples [not from marriage
but] from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage” renders such couples “outsiders”); 72
(noting “intangible damage” to same-sex couples, including their present inability “to celebrate
their commitment to each other [not in a marriage ceremony but] in a joyous public event
recognized by the law,” and stating that “[i]f heterosexual couples have the option of deciding
whether to marry or not, so should same-sex couples have the choice as whether to seek to
achieve [not marital status but] a status and a set of entitlements and responsibilities [not
identical to but] on a par with those enjoyed by heterosexual couples.”); 75 (“It is clear that the
exclusion of same-sex couples [not from marriage but] from the status, entitlements and
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This conclusion—that the Fourie opinion leaves Parliament free
to provide a legal arrangement for same-sex couples that does not
redefine marriage—is supported, not undermined, by three other
portions of the opinion that in some way take up the concept of
redefinition.
First is the portion where the opinion addresses the contention of
the government and amici that “whatever remedy the state adopts
cannot include altering the definition of marriage” contained in the
impugned laws, that is, the union of a man and a woman.147 The
opinion rejects the four arguments advanced in support of this
contention148 and, in doing so, of course rejects the contention. But
note carefully what the contention is. The contention is simply that
responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples through marriage, constitutes a denial to them
of their right to equal protection and benefit of the law.”); 77 (“The problem is that the Marriage
Act simply makes no provision for them [i.e., same-sex couples] [not to marry but] to have their
unions recognized and protected in the same way as it does for those of heterosexual couples.”);
78 (the unconstitutional defect is that “the law in the past failed to secure for same-sex couples
[not marriage but] the dignity, benefits and responsibilities that it accords to heterosexual
couples”); 79 (the impugned laws constitute “unfair discrimination . . . to the extent that the law
makes no provision for them [i.e., same-sex couples] [not to marry but] to achieve the dignity,
status, benefits and responsibilities available to heterosexual couples through marriage”); 81 (to be
constitutional sufficient, the law “would also have to accord to same-sex couples [not entry into
marriage but] a public and private status equal to that which heterosexual couples achieve from
being married”); 82 (the impugned laws are “unconstitutional to the extent that they make no
appropriate provision for gay and lesbian people [not to marry but] to celebrate their unions in
the same way that they enable heterosexual couples to do so”); 87 (the “procreation argument . . .
cannot prevail in the face of the claim of same-sex couples to be accorded [not marriage but] the
status, entitlements, and responsibilities which heterosexual couples receive through marriage”);
98 (speaking of “the right of same-sex couples [not to marry but] to enjoy the same status,
entitlements and responsibilities as marriage law accords to heterosexual couples”); 105 (same as
just quoted); 114 (the failure of the impugned laws, not to redefine marriage as the union of any
two persons but, “to provide the means whereby same-sex couples can enjoy the same status,
entitlements and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples through marriage, constitutes
an unjustifiable violation of their” constitutional rights); 117 (the law relative to marriage vows is
deficient not because same-sex couples cannot take those vows but because the law does not allow
“for an equivalent [not the same] public declaration being made by same-sex couples”); 118 (the
impugned laws are unconstitutional to the “extent that they make no provision for same-sex
couples [not to marry but] to enjoy the status, entitlements and responsibilities it accords to
heterosexual couples”).
147. Id. at para. 83.
148. Id. at paras. 84–109.
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“the state,” meaning each branch of the government, is powerless to
alter the man/woman definition. The opinion here rejects this
contention, as it must to validate what it does later—declare that, by
judicial act, marriage will be redefined if, within one year, Parliament
does not provide an adequate legal arrangement for same-sex
couples.149 In short, nothing in this portion of the opinion amounts
to a holding that Parliament must redefine marriage, only that it may.
The second portion addresses the question of what is to be done
with the old common law definition of marriage. The opinion says
that “the common law definition of marriage is inconsistent with the
Constitution and invalid to the extent that if fails to provide to samesex couples the status and benefits coupled with responsibilities
which it accords to heterosexual couples.”150 But the “question then
arises whether, having made such a declaration, the Court itself
should develop the common law so as to remedy the consequences of
the common law’s under-inclusive character.”151 The court’s answer
is “no,”152 at least for the year that Parliament is given to enact
comprehensive legislation. This is because the court could
take account of the impact that any correction to the [Marriage]
Act, or enactment of a separate statute, would automatically have
on the common law. Thus a legislative intervention which had
the effect of enabling same-sex couples to enjoy the status,
entitlements and responsibilities that heterosexual couples
achieve through marriage, would without more override any
discriminatory impact flowing from the common law definition
standing on its own.153

149. Id. at para. 161. The court, unlike Parliament, has available to it of course only the blunt
tool of the redefinition of marriage.
150. Id. at para. 120.
151. Id.
152. Id. at paras. 122, 135, 139.
153. Id. at para. 122.
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With these words regarding “a separate statute” and “enabling
same-sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements and
responsibilities that heterosexual couples achieve through marriage,”
the court yet again154 made clear that an acceptable Parliamentary
solution need not be the redefinition of marriage. And equally
clearly, the Fourie opinion did not alter the common law definition
of marriage to the union of any two persons.
The third portion covers the opinion’s firm rejection of a
“separate but equal” legal arrangement flowing from discriminatory
animus.155 That portion does not support the notion that Parliament
must redefine marriage because the separate-but-equal rejection is
immediately followed by these careful words:
It is precisely sensitivity to context and impact that suggest
that equal treatment does not invariably require identical
treatments. . . . Differential treatment in itself does not
necessarily violate the dignity of those affected. It is when
separation implies repudiation, connotes distaste or inferiority
and perpetuates a caste-like status that it becomes
constitutionally invidious.156

Those careful words rather plainly allow rather than reject a
Parliamentary solution that does not redefine marriage.
The interesting question arising from all this—that is, from the
Fourie opinion’s forceful and at times moving language calling for
equality, dignity, and respect for gay men and lesbians, on one hand,

154. Id.
155. Id. at paras. 150–51.
156. Id. at para. 152. Of course, Parliamentary action that accommodates same-sex couples
but does not redefine marriage, when taken on the basis of the social institutional argument,
would partake of no discriminatory animus. The purpose of that argument, its animus if you will,
is to preserve the vital social goods provided uniquely by man/woman marriage; the argument is
devoid of animus towards gay men and lesbians in our society. See infra Section V.
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and, on the other hand, the opinion’s refusal to judicially redefine
marriage to achieve that equality, dignity, and respect coupled with
its deference to Parliament to select a solution, including one that
does not redefine marriage—is whether there is a way to plausibly
and rationally harmonize those two fundamental aspects of the
opinion. I suggest that there is a way. That way is to understand that
the justices comprehended and respected the social institutional
argument. Reflection sustains this understanding.
First, there is the Fourie opinion’s very curious approach to the
social institutional argument in the “Remedy” section. The
government and pro-marriage amici had “argued forcibly against”
judicial redefinition of marriage as a remedy because such a remedy
“would not merely modify a well-established institution” but “would
completely restructure and possibly even destroy it as an
institution.”157 The court saw this as a “three-fold” argument:
[F]irst, that time should be given for the public to be involved in
an issue of such great public interest and importance; second,
that it was neither competent nor appropriate for the Court itself
to restructure the institution of marriage in such a radical way;
and third, that only Parliament had the authority to create such a
radical remedy . . . .158

The court followed by saying that it would “start”159 with the
public involvement component, a component the opinion rejects
because of the substantial public involvement relative to the South
Africa Law Reform Commission endeavor.160 After that “start,”
however, the opinion does not expressly signal that it is next
addressing the second and third components of the government’s

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at para. 123.
Id.
Id. at para. 124.
Id. at paras. 124–31.
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argument, the respective competence of the court and of Parliament
to “radically restructure and possibly even destroy” the man/woman
marriage institution. Indeed, the opinion thereafter never counters
or even questions the government’s argument about adverse
institutional impacts. What the opinion does do, in those following
paragraphs, is defer to Parliamentary competence and, as shown
above, give Parliament the leeway to provide to same-sex couples a
legal arrangement that does not redefine marriage, an arrangement
that thus would avoid all the ill effects to result from
deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage. That deference
reflects respect for rather than repudiation of the social institutional
argument.
It is true that, in providing for judicial redefinition if Parliament
does not act within one year,161 the opinion validates the court’s raw
power to so act. But one senses the court’s belief that Parliament will
act timely and adequately; to deny that belief is to ascribe a deep
cynicism to the court. And a court with a grasp of the social
institutional realities will want, for reasons of the court’s own
institutional interests, any redefinition, if it is to happen, to be a
legislative rather than a judicial act.
In that way, adverse
consequences of deinstitutionalization can plausibly be labelled the
responsibility of another branch of government; after all, the court
can always say truthfully, as demonstrated above, that it gave
Parliament the leeway to provide a legal arrangement for same-sex
couples that did not require the redefinition of marriage.162

161. Id. at para. 161.
162. Relatedly, the court certainly must have recognized that only Parliament had the tools to
craft a sophisticated legal arrangement accommodating and reconciling the many social interests
at stake, the court by contrast having only a blunt tool, the redefinition or not of marriage.
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Finally, there is this: The Fourie opinion was authored by Justice
Albie Sachs. He is a brilliant person of vast learning.163 It is therefore
virtually certain that he has, and probably has had for a long time, a
firm grasp of the understandings and insights emerging from social
institutional studies and comprising the building blocks of the social
institutional argument for the preservation of man/woman marriage;
those understandings and insights are uncontroversial among those
who have seriously attended to the subject.164 This is not to say that
Justice Sachs accepts all aspects of the social institutional argument as
set forth here or that argument’s ultimate conclusion in favor of
preservation, but it is to say with some confidence that his would not
be a mind that would lightly dismiss (or dismiss at all) the reality that
changing core meanings constitutive of a vital social institution must
inevitably have profound social impacts. His understanding that
some of those impacts could be adverse is consistent with his
opinion’s act of sending the issue to Parliament with the power in
Parliament, if it chooses, to not redefine marriage.
For these reasons, it seems valid to see the Fourie opinion as
respecting, not rejecting by elision or otherwise, the social
institutional argument. A contrary view of the opinion, given the
opinion’s careful language, seems hardly defensible. In any event, the
validity of both possible views will likely be put to the test; postFourie, the gay/lesbian rights movement in South Africa has stated its
intention to challenge in court any Parliamentary resolution other

163. My positive authority for that assertion is my careful reading over a number of years of
his judicial opinions; my negative authority, no knowledgeable person will deny the assertion.
164. See note 53 supra.
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than one redefining marriage from the union of a man and a woman
to the union of any two persons.165
IV
NON-JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
I see two efforts to engage to some extent the social institutional
argument. The first may be fairly called the “evolving marriage
institution” argument; the second, the “overt social engineering”
argument.
A. The “Evolving Marriage Institution” Argument
This argument’s most recent and perhaps most articulate
iteration is Nicholas Bala’s,166 and it is that iteration that I will follow
most closely.
The argument is premised most fundamentally on the
uncontroversial understanding that marriage always has been and
continues to be an “evolving” social institution. In Professor Bala’s
words:
[M]arriage has not been a static social or legal institution. Rather
marriage has changed over the course of history in response to
changing religious beliefs, social values and behaviors, technology
and even demographics. Similarly there is great variation today
in marital behaviors, attitudes and laws about marriage in
different countries.167

He further builds on the likewise uncontroversial understanding
that “marriage laws [have] both reflected and reinforced changes in

165. Telephone interview with Hazel Shelton, South African government lawyer in the Fourie
case (Dec. 8, 2005).
166. Bala, supra note 4.
167. Id. at 1.
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attitudes towards and behavior in marriage.”168 This language calls to
mind the uncontroversial social institutional reality that society uses
the law’s authoritative voice to reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the
shared public meanings that constitute a social institution.
Professor Bala’s next step also calls to mind another
uncontroversial social institutional reality. He focuses particularly
on those changes in the law that, in his judgment, both logically
support and lead public opinion to support the next “inevitable”
change in marriage law, the redefinition of marriage from the union
of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons. He says, “In
both Canada and the USA the laws and expectations for husbands
and wives within marriage have changed dramatically over the past
half century, setting the stage for the possible redefinition of
marriage to include same-sex partners.”169 The institutional reality
underlying and supporting this step is simply this: The shared
meanings that constitute a social institution interact and are
interdependent; each meaning affects and is dependent on all the
others. “An institution is a web of interrelated norms—formal and
informal—governing social relationships.”170
The legal changes on which Bala relies are those moving away
from gender-based rights and roles towards legal equality of
spouses;171 away from “the procreation of children . . . as a central
purpose of marriage, as . . . reflected in the common concept of
consummation;”172 away from no legal protection (even penalties) for

168. Id.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Nee & Ingram, supra note 16, at 19.
171. “Spouses are viewed as legally equal. Gender roles in marriage are no longer legally
prescribed.” Bala, supra note 4, at 8.
172. Id. at 4.
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unwed, co-habiting couples and their offspring towards legal
provision to them of a variety of rights and protections;173 and away
from the recognition of natural parenthood (that is, parenthood
arising from biological ties) towards the recognition of legal
parenthood (that is, parenthood as solely a status conferred by law,
which may or may not consider biological ties).174 Regarding the
elimination of gender rights and roles in marriage, he says: “It is
more difficult to argue that marriage requires two spouses of
opposite gender, since there are no longer legally specified gender
roles, and socially there is growing ambiguity about the roles of
‘husband’ and ‘wife.’”175
Regarding both marriage-like legal
arrangements governing unwed, co-habiting couples and the
recognition of legal parenthood, he says: “The approach of Canadian
courts and legislatures to unmarried opposite-sex partners and
relationships of children to psychological parents has . . . laid the
ground work for a more flexible approach for the more recent
recognition of same-sex relationships.”176
Although Bala does not provide anywhere a summary of his
response to the social institutional argument, it seems that his
response can be fairly abridged to this: The social and legal trends
relative to the marriage institution are clear; the constitutive
meanings of the institution are changing in a way that must
inevitably lead to the law’s replacement of the core man/woman
meaning with the “any two persons” meaning.

173. Id. at 10.
174. Id. at 8. Bala does not note this but C-38, the Canadian law mandating genderless
marriage, contains a provision, albeit amending the Income Tax Act, expressly replacing natural
parenthood with legal parenthood.
175. Id. at 8.
176. Id. at 15.
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An evaluation of Bala’s response, it seems to me, requires the
application of two important distinctions. The first is between
institutional change resulting from forces other than the law, on one
hand, and, on the other hand, law-mandated institutional change. In
other words, the law can either require or merely reflect institutional
change, and those are different phenomenon. With some subjects,
those two phenomenon may play on each other so subtly and
imperceptibly that they appear as one. But that is certainly not the
North American marriage experience. But for EGALE and Halpern,
there would be no genderless marriage in Canada today. In the
presence of authoritative court decisions holding that man/woman
marriage is compatible with and can certainly continue to be
nurtured under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there
would be no genderless marriage in Canada for a long time, if ever.177
But for Goodridge, there would be no genderless marriage anywhere
in the United States today, and most probably that would continue to
be the case for a long time. To state the obvious in slightly different
words, it was EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge that switched the
meaning of marriage at its core, not society.178 As noted earlier, while
it is true that in our society the shared constitutive meanings of the
marriage institution do not include a large number of less central
177. In a May 2003 seminar at Oxford University on the marriage issue in Canada and the
United States, genderless marriage advocate Professor Robert Wintemute said that if the Supreme
Court of Canada held that man/woman marriage was compatible with the Charter (a possibility
he was not willing to seriously entertain), Parliament would not enact C-38, the genderless
marriage bill. In December 2004, that court refused to answer the question, leaving EGALE and
Halpern as the two authoritative voices on the Charter issue. In July 2005, Parliament enacted C38 after its proponents successfully cast the issue as one strictly of Charter rights and therefore
human rights. The preamble to C-38 repeats that rhetoric.
178. Because of the nature of the remedy in South Africa’s Fourie case (leaving it to
Parliament, until December 1, 2006, to find “the best ways of ensuring that same-sex couples are
brought in from the legal cold”), it is too early to characterize the nature of the phenomenon in
that country. Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 138 (S. Afr. Const.
Ct Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/JCCT60-04.
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practices, those shared constitutive meanings most certainly include
a bride and a groom, a wife and a husband. And that will continue to
be the case even in Canada until the revolution consolidates its
position, something that institutional studies suggest will not take
long.
For reasons that should become clear, the second important
distinction is related practically to the first. That is the distinction
between judge-made law and legislation. In the world, we see judicial
redefinition of marriage with no legislative role (Massachusetts),
legislative redefinition of marriage pursuant or in response to a
judicial mandate (Canada), and legislative redefinition without
judicial involvement (Netherlands, Belgium, Spain). Speaking
generally, it seems fair to say that the third phenomenon is much
more likely to reflect rather than require sea changes relative to the
core constitutive meanings of marriage. The legislative redefinition
in Europe, even in Spain, appears to have majority support, which
may flow from favor for justice/equality notions (a matter discussed
below), from ignorance of the social institutional realities at play,
from apathy relative to the man/woman marriage institution,
including a devaluing of its social goods, or from some combination
of those. As already demonstrated, the North American experience
in contrast has been one of judge-made law requiring, not reflecting,
social favor for the replacement of man/woman marriage with
genderless marriage.
My first criticism of Professor Bala’s response to the social
institutional argument is its failure to work through the implications
of these two distinctions. The response is, after all, a response to an

H 65 I

01__STEWART.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:33:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

argument deployed in very large measure in the judicial arena.179 It
seems the response therefore should concern itself with arguments
appropriately made to a judge resolving (at least ostensibly) a
constitutional equality or liberty claim. What arguments Bala’s
response is making to a judge in that context are not at all clear to
me. But here are some guesses, with critiques.
Bala may be saying to a judge, “The direction and pace of the
social/legal changes relative to the marriage institution make
inevitable the big change to genderless marriage. Therefore, you can
greatly discount the societal interests in man/woman marriage’s
social goods because of those goods’ very short shelf-life.” The
validity of this argument, of course, depends on the validity of the
claim of inevitability, a claim founded on a confidently made reading
of where social currents in history will certainly carry the marriage
institution. Although the message of inevitability is a brilliant
political move,180 as an intellectual proposition it is dubious. For my
part, I am prepared to accord to the inevitability message relative to
genderless marriage all the respect and all the acknowledgements of
validity due to another message of inevitability clearly to be perceived

179. The social institutional argument is deployed in the legislative arena to a much lesser
extent, probably for two reasons. First, other than California’s, no state legislature has yet
seriously considered redefining marriage. Second, it seems that until recently that argument’s
depth has not been fully congenial with the level of discourse that largely prevails in that arena.
180. This message of inevitability is a brilliant political move because it strengthens and
encourages the troops on one side to see the long conflict through to its inevitable glorious
outcome. At the same time, the message is influential in making those whose hearts and minds
have them on the other side of the conflict more passive, more defeatist, less willing to make the
kinds of sacrifices that could well make a material difference in the conflict. This past year, that
phenomenon was seen first hand in Canada among those (actually a majority) who wanted to
preserve marriage as the union of a man and a woman. Also, it seems at least interesting that so
many different social movements have as a core belief the inevitability of the movement’s
triumph. I was recently reminded that Christianity is like that. An evangelical minister,
discouraged by events in Canada and trying to cheer up himself and those around him, said,
“Well, I peeked and read the last chapter, and we win.” He was referring of course to the Book of
Revelation, with its message of the final triumph of Christianity.
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in powerful social currents revealed by history, the message preached
by Karl Marx. If nothing else, the course of Marxism should teach us
to be amply humble when setting forth, as an intellectual
proposition, the inevitability of something as radical as the
deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage and its replacement
by the institution of genderless marriage.181
A particularly toxic aspect of the inevitability argument in the
judicial arena is its proclivity to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Each judge who acts on the basis of the argument supplies further
“evidence” of the inevitability of genderless marriage. It is entirely
plausible that a bare majority of the judges (21 individuals) on the
highest courts of a handful of key states—Massachusetts (a 4-3
decision), Washington, New Jersey, California, and New York—will
play a material role in replacing man/woman marriage with
genderless marriage. To then label that outcome the result of
irresistible social forces is to be devious; to label it the work of 21
individuals who could have (and almost certainly should have)182
chosen to do otherwise is to be very much more accurate.
Bala may also be saying to a judge, “The direction and pace of the
social/legal changes relative to the marriage institution means that
the change to genderless marriage must be seen as a relatively small
and evolutionary step, which means in turn that the societal impacts
will be small and readily accommodated, without any serious societal
harm.” This argument can be seen as building on the social
institutional realities that the shared meanings constituting a social

181. Maggie Gallagher strongly counters the “inevitability” argument in Gallagher, supra note
8, at 68–69, and in Joshua K. Baker & Maggie Gallagher, Not Inevitable, National Review Online
(Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/baker_gallagher200412010836.asp.
182. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 130–32 (a summary of how the EGALE, Halpern, and
Goodridge courts “did an unacceptable job with their performance of the very tasks that lie at the
heart of judicial responsibility in virtually every case”).
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institution interact and are interdependent and that in that web of
interrelated norms governing social relationships relative to marriage
are to be seen a number of fairly recently changed meanings.
But this argument ignores other social institutional realities. One
is that, although constitutive meanings interact, some of the social
goods provided by an institution flow quite particularly from one
core meaning. Here is an example: Prior to the mid-1970’s, a core
meaning of marriage was permanence. That particular institutional
meaning succeeded, to a degree that now looks remarkable, in
teaching and forming individuals, in molding their identities, and in
restraining antithetical impulses in a way that led to a relatively low
rate of divorce and separation. Among the resulting social goods
were a relatively high level of family stability and a relatively high and
concomitant level of childhood well-being (emotional, psychological,
and financial). In a surge of “reform” between the mid-1960’s and
the mid-1970’s, however, American and Canadian legislatures
adopted legislation providing for no-fault divorce.183 In this way and
at this time, it seems fair to say, the law’s authoritative voice at least
for a while effectively minimized permanence as a constitutive
meaning of the marriage institution. In the light of social
institutional studies, what in fact then happened was unsurprising: In
the ensuing years divorce skyrocketed184 and the number of children

183. By 1977, all but seven states had enacted no-fault divorce, and four of those seven
followed within several years. Illinois made the change in 1984; South Dakota, in 1985, Utah, in
1987. Paul A. Nakonezny, Robert D. Shull, and Joseph Lee Rodgers, The Effect of No-Fault
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education, and
Religiosity, 57 J. MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 477, 480 (1995).
184. In 1965, the American divorce rate was 10.6 per 1,000 married women age 15 and older;
in 1985, it was 21.7. The National Marriage Project, The State of Our Unions 2004 at 19, available
at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/SOOU2004.pdf.
In and of itself, conclusive proof of correlation (the timing of the no-fault divorce “reform”
and of the upsurge in divorces) is not conclusive proof of causation (the “reform” as a substantial
cause of the upsurge). But the correlation is certainly good evidence relative to the causation
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of divorce rose to many millions.185 The further results, now
extraordinarily well documented, have been substantial injury to the
physical, psychological, emotional, and financial well-being both of
those made children of divorce by that “divorce revolution” and of
their mothers.186
Bala’s response does not explain how past changes of some
constitutive meanings of marriage (whether for good or for ill) make
more or less wise the proposed elimination of the man/woman

issue, and once it is paired with social institutional studies, the evidence it seems to me should at
least shift the burden of proof and persuasion to those who would absolve the no-fault divorce
“reform” of responsibility. See Nakonezny et al., supra note 183, at 487 (“[T]he enactment of nofault divorce law had a clear positive influence on divorce rates.”)
185. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF
DIVORCE (2005).
186. E.g., id.; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS, SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED
LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000); LINDA J. WAITE &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER,
HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE
CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY (1996).
Professor Bala attempts to dispute or at least downplay the social institutional realities
underlying what he calls the “divorce revolution.” Bala, supra note 4, at 6–7. He says that there is
“controversy about whether the adoption of a no-fault regime is related to any long term effects
on rates of divorce and family breakdown” and that “adoption of a no-fault regime is weakly
correlated with increases in long term divorce rates.” Id. at 7. He suggests that “[m]ost if not all
of the increase in divorce rates in North America is attributable to a complex interaction of social,
cultural and economic factors.”
A footnote is not a good place to ventilate well a correlation/causation issue, see note 182
above, like this one. But these observations seem justified. Bala ignores the insights and even
predictive power of social institutional studies in discussing the issue. He also fails to address a
scientifically rigorous study of the question, Nakonezny et al., supra note 183, and therefore fails
to come to grips in an equally rigorous way with its conclusion: “[T]he enactment of no-fault
divorce law had a clear positive influence on divorce rates.” Id. at 487. Bala’s argument also
violates the rule of Ockham’s Razor in that, without demonstrating the inadequacy of the more
parsimonious explanation (correlation plus the insights of social institutional studies), it rests on a
multiplicity of vaguely alluded to “social, cultural, and economic factors” in “complex
interaction.” Bala, supra note 4, at 5. See Paul Vincent Spade, Ockham’s Nominalist Metaphysics:
Some Main Themes, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO OCKHAM (Paul Vincent Spade ed., 1999)
at 101–02. Finally, Bala’s approach is marred by a certain inconsistency. He minimizes the law’s
impact on a marriage negative (great increase in divorce) but maximizes the law’s impact in
paving the way for what he views as a marriage positive (genderless marriage). E.g., Bala, supra
note 4, at 26 (“As a result of constitutional litigation, the Canadian courts prodded reluctant
politicians to take action on a controversial issue . . . .”).
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meaning. Unless he is arguing that change for change’s sake is good,
it seems fair to require that his (or any) response based on the
“evolving” nature of marriage demonstrate the wisdom of the next
proposed change. After all, the valuable social goods identified at
this article’s outset result in large measure or entirely from the
man/woman meaning. To lose that meaning is to lose those goods,
just as the loss of the core meaning of permanence meant the loss of
its goods—a loss now viewed, in the midst of considerable resulting
suffering, as grievous. Any comfort derived from this assurance thus
seems illusory: “Genderless marriage must be seen as a relatively
small and evolutionary step, which means in turn that the societal
impacts will be small and readily accommodated, without any serious
societal harm.”
One other aspect of Bala’s response merit analysis. That response
is replete with references to religious folks’ opposition to genderless
marriage.187
Those references are entirely appropriate to
demonstrate the social/political dynamics leading to adoption, or
not, of genderless marriage; his response helpfully discusses both the
legal and the non-legal aspects of “evolving” marriage. But a
question arises whether, intending to or not, the response is also
suggesting that the arguments against the move to genderless
marriage all derive ultimately from religious tradition and discourse.
If so, that suggestion is disquieting. As Margaret Somerville has
noted:
One strategy used by same-sex marriage advocates is to label
all people who oppose same-sex marriage as doing so for
religious or moral reasons in order to dismiss them and their
arguments as irrelevant to public policy. Good secular reasons to

187. Bala, supra note 4, at 1–6, 25, 32, 38.
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oppose same-sex marriage are re-characterized as religious or as
based on personal morality and, therefore, as not applicable at a
societal level. . . . These [tactics] . . . do not serve the best
interests of either individuals or society in this debate.188

Whatever the religiosity (or otherwise) of those advancing the
social institutional argument, the argument itself unquestionably
qualifies as “good secular reasons,” or as Rawlsian “public reason.”189
Indeed, the social institutional argument rather precisely meets the
high standard urged by Linda McClain: “The requirements of public
reason would . . . require the delineation of precisely how same-sex
marriages threaten the institution of marriage in terms of public
reasons and political values implicit in our public culture.” 190
B. The “Overt Social Engineering” Argument
This argument generally proceeds in two steps. To begin, the
argument accepts, at least implicitly, virtually all the building blocks
of the social institutional argument. On that basis, it then asserts
that, exactly because of the powerful formative and transformative
nature of social institutions, especially marriage, this core
man/woman meaning must be changed, for to do so will result in a
more just and equal society.
This argument partakes of intellectual honesty and moral
bravery. It is intellectually honest to the extent it does not elide social
institutional realities, realities that those who have attended
rigorously to institutional studies deem essentially uncontroversial.
It is morally brave to the extent it speaks publicly of the ultimate

188. Somerville, supra note 34, at 70–71.
189. E.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
190. Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex
Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1998).
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objective of the redefinition project, to use institutional power to
transform the hearts and minds of the general populace in a way that
assures full public acceptance of gay and lesbian identities and
lifestyle. Such public acknowledgement of that ultimate objective is
rare. Recent scholarship from man/woman marriage proponents has
pointed to that ultimate objective,191 as has the South Africa
Constitutional Court.192 Bala almost gets there:
Further, it is clear that for a variety of social, psychological and
legal reasons, only a minority of homosexuals in long-term
relationships will exercise the right to marry in the foreseeable
future. Nevertheless, the recognition of same-sex marriage is of
profound symbolic significance, both for advocates and
opponents. The [favorable] court decisions about same-sex
marriage and the ultimate [Canadian] government response
recognize the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to full
equality under the law and provide important social validation of
these relationships.193

But beyond these and a few other scattered acknowledgements
about an ultimate “non-marriage” objective rooted in social
institutional realities,194 there is silence in the public marriage debate.

191. Wardle, supra note 73, at 256 nn.181–82; Stewart & Duncan, supra note 9.
192. Minister of Public Health v. Fourie, CCT 60/04, slip op. at para. 137 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.
Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/JCCT60-04:
The claim by the applicants in Fourie of the right to get married should, in my view, be
seen as part of a comprehensive wish to be able to live openly and freely as lesbian
woman emancipated from all the legal taboos that historically have kept them from
enjoying life in the mainstream of society. The right to celebrate their union
accordingly signifies far more than a right to enter into a legal arrangement with many
attendant and significant consequences, important though they may be. It represents a
major symbolical milestone in their long walk to equality and dignity.
Id. Immediately thereafter, the opinion acknowledges: “The law … serves as a great teacher [and]
establishes public norms . . . .” Id. at para. 138.
193. Bala, supra note 4, at 26–27 (footnotes omitted).
194. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 17 (“In the context of marriage, we are telling people in a
way that almost no other institution tells people, that we mean business about the absolute
equality of human beings in this society.”); Wise & Stanley, supra note 73, at 335 (“This position
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That silence almost certainly results from calculation by
genderless marriage proponents that what is publicly talked about—
governmental benefits pertaining to marriage status, emotional
benefits, protections for the children in homes headed by same-sex
couples—is more politically (in the broadest sense of the word)
effective. And this calculation works with a further calculation—that
it is politically unwise to acknowledge the social institutional realities
implicated by redefinition exactly because those realities shine the
light on a price tag, indeed write that price tag. That price tag, of
course, is the value of man/woman marriage’s social goods inevitably
lost when that institution is replaced with the new institution of
genderless marriage. That new institution’s meanings may or may
not produce valuable social goods, but it plainly cannot produce
those valuable goods resulting from the man/woman meaning
constitutive of the old institution.
These understandings lead to my initial criticism of the “overt
social engineering” argument, that it is incomplete. So far, it
provides no answer to two questions raised by what it does provide.
The first question is this: Why should we conclude that a rigorous
valuation of the promised gains and the certain losses will show a net
gain to society generally? The second: To what extent, if any, is that
valuation, that cost-benefit analysis, rightly a job for judges?
That first question brings me back to Barbara and Klara. The
1918 Soviet constitution replaced the old private property institution
with a new property institution. That exchange undoubtedly made
[of genderless marriage advocates] acknowledges the key, foundational properties of marriage as a
social institution, for this is precisely why it is thought it will lead to social equality.”); Graff, supra
note 53, at 12 (“Marriage is an institution that towers on our social horizon, defining how we
think about one another . . . . If same-sex marriage becomes legal, that venerable institution will
ever after stand for sexual choice . . . .”); cf. Cott, supra note 105, at 90 (the law’s power over the
marriage institution ought to be used “to serve more egalitarian social goals than those served in
the past—goals attuned to the actual diversity of society in the United States”).
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for, in certain respects, a more equal society. But with its eye on the
whole of human experience, history has judged that exchange a very
bad one indeed. So the first question is crucial, and to date no one
has made a careful, transparent valuation of man/woman marriage’s
unique social goods sure to be lost and genderless marriage’s
necessarily speculative benefits. Those who have spoken somewhat
openly about using the institution of marriage for non-marriage ends
speak almost exclusively of genderless marriage’s benefits to the gay
and lesbian community and thus say virtually nothing about the
consequences to society generally, apparently out of a lack of interest
in that subject or on the basis of an unstated assumption that what is
good for the gay and lesbian community is good for society generally.
Yet absent a credible society-wide valuation of the losses and gains to
result from the proposed institutional exchange, the case for that
exchange must remain materially deficient.
The second question—should judges be in the business either of
creating their own or evaluating someone else’s valuation of the
losses and gains to result from the proposed institutional exchange—
quite clearly ought to be answered “no.” Even the judges mandating
genderless marriage in Goodridge, Halpern, and EGALE did not
claim a competence to engage in such a task; they reached their
holding by denying the possibility of any losses, any downside, from
their replacement of the old institution with the new, a denial clearly
false. Once social institutional realities are given their due, and
consequently once the judicial task can no longer be characterized
with any credibility as discarding a legal definition of marriage with
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no rational basis,195 the fact-finding and constitutional competence of
judges to engage the real task must be seriously doubted.196
The “overt social engineering” argument has other defects. It is
plagued by a very considerable circularity in its notion of using the
marriage institution to make ours a more just and equal society. The
notion proceeds from the assumed or implied premise that of course
man/woman marriage violates equality norms and that genderless
marriage will make ours a more just society. From this beginning, it
is not difficult to move to the conclusion that man/woman marriage
violates equality norms and that genderless marriage will make ours a
more just society. But it should go without saying that what the
important discourse is all about is the meaning of equality in the
context of marriage, particularly its social institutional realities. The
debate to date strongly suggests that the equality argument for
genderless marriage can succeed only if one ignores those realities
and, even more, only if one replaces the full institutional
understanding of man/woman marriage with the impoverished
“close personal relationship model.” That model is of a “pure
relationship,” that is, a relationship stripped of any goal or end
beyond the intrinsic, emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction
that the relationship brings to the two adult individuals involved.197
Judicial rejection of that model because it inadequately describes
what marriage “is” results in judicial rejection of the equality

195. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961; Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY
Slip Op 09436 at *37–38 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (Saxe, J.P., dissenting), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm.
196. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The practice of
deferring to rationally based legislative judgments . . . reflects our respect for the institutional
competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our
appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accountability in dealing with
matters open to a wide range of possible choices.”).
197. Cere, supra note 10, at 12–20; Stewart, supra note 6, at 95–96.
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argument for genderless marriage.198 Judicial acceptance of that
model’s accuracy and adequacy is the foundation for judicial
acceptance of that equality argument,199 but to date judicial
acceptance of the close personal relationship model has been an
unexamined and unproven starting point of analysis, not the result of
thoughtful examination. This obvious feature of cases such as
Halpern and Goodridge has led Douglas Farrow to label, and fairly so,
their approach as “obviously circular, and viciously so.”200

198. See Lewis, 875 A.2d at 275–76 (J. Parrillo, concurring) (arguing that the close personal
relationship model improperly ignores the full gamut of what man/woman marriage is about).
199. Stewart, supra note 6, at 97 (“Language in [EGALE, Halpern, and Goodridge] suggests …
that the courts deciding those case have consciously accepted the arguments of the close personal
relationship theorists.”). See Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04, 2005 NY Slip Op 09436
(N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm, where the majority, in rejecting a state constitutional
claim to genderless marriage, refused to adopt the close personal relationship model of marriage,
which “treats all intimate and dependent relations as equal,” id. at *9, while the dissent
unequivocally adopted that model, albeit with no justification other than the bare assertion that
such now constitutes a “widely held view” of marriage. Id. at *30.
200. Farrow, supra note 129, at 98–99:
To proceed at all, we need to notice that the main rights argument [equality] amounts
to a nice piece of subterfuge. Its conclusion is that marriage must be redefined. This
distracts us from the fact that marriage has already been redefined in the argument’s
very first move. That is, a new category—the “close personal adult relationship”—has
been invented to provide a framework for our understanding of marriage. Once this
framework is accepted, it follows that homosexual unions can be marriage-like and, in
that case, should qualify as marriage. If marriage is nothing but a certain form of
publicly acknowledged sexual intimacy and commitment between two persons, one to
which gender and biology and procreation are not directly relevant, why should the two
persons not be of the same sex? Would we not be discriminating against such persons
by denying to their relationship the name and benefits of marriage? And what requires
such a denial? Merely the common-law definition of marriage as the union of a man
and a woman. So let us change the definition and write into law that marriage is a close
personal relationship between adults, a union of two persons. That will erase the
discrimination and resolve the equality-rights violation. Marriage will be open to
homosexuals.
This argument is obviously circular, and viciously so. Certainly there can be
nothing wrong with saying that, if marriage is simply a union of two persons, two
persons of the same sex must not be denied a marriage licence. Nor is it necessarily
wrong (though it may be foolish) to write into law that marriage is, or rather will be,
simply a union of two persons. It is wrong, however, to claim that we must write this
new definition into law in order to avoid unconstitutional discrimination and equality-
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Further, the equality argument for genderless marriage has not
yet come to grips with other social institutional realities, particularly
the understandings that same-sex couples simply cannot enter the
privileged marriage institution we have always known and that the
sought for “marriage equality” can be achieved only by creating a
radically new institution into which already married men and
women are pulled and into which all couples seeking marriage in the
future will enter. These understandings necessarily lead to reflection
on some basic ideals of equality jurisprudence, treating similarly
situated people similarly and not treating dissimilarly situated people
as the same.201 The simple fact is that, relative to the valued marriage
institution received to date, man/woman couples and same-sex
couples are not similarly situated. And this is not a matter of “legal
definitional preclusion.” Rather, this is a matter of the very nature
and purposes of this social institution. That nature and those
purposes are clearly not the result of any anti-gay/lesbian animus202
rights violations, when in fact no such discrimination or violation is possible until after
the new definition is in place.
201. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (ruling that a class of one
treated differently from others similarly situated can be discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (the Equal
Protection Clause is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike"); ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICHOMACEA 1113a–13b Book V3 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) ("[T]hings that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should
be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness."); cf. Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at paras. 4–21. Regarding Andrews’s conception that Charter
equality “entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are
recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration,”
Andrews, 1 S.C.R. 143, at para. 16, and the application of that conception to genderless marriage
claims, see Stewart, supra note 6, at 102–15.
202. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999) (“Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage was intended to discriminate
against women or lesbians and gay men, as racial segregation was designed to maintain the
pernicious doctrine of white supremacy.”); compare Hernandez v. Robles, Index No. 103434/04,
2005 NY Slip Op 09436, at *19 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2005) (Catterson, J., concurring), available
at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_09436.htm (“Plaintiffs have not
alleged, much less proved, that the legislators who enacted the New York statutes related to
marriage were motivated by” an “anti-homosexual animus.”), with id. at *34 (Saxe, J.P.,
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but have their own practical logic and effectiveness. In this light,
those making the equality argument for genderless marriage simply
have not made their case at the most fundamental level of equality
jurisprudence. In this light, the equality argument for genderless
marriage shows itself as nothing more than a demand that the law
eliminate a vital social institution—an ancient institution of
betterment and one fashioned from the beginning with no relevant
animus, an institution that provides social goods crucially important
to society—so that those dissimilarly situated relative to that
institution will be leveled.
V
CONCLUSION
To not blink at the social institutional realities is to realize, with
understandable regret, that there can be no “win-win” outcome to
the present marriage contest. A society can sustain and nurture
man/woman marriage but only by declining genderless marriage. Or
a society can sustain and nurture genderless marriage but only by
causing, through force of law, the demise of the old institution. Each
society must choose. And a choice as portentous as this choice may
never come before us again. 203

dissenting) (“The discriminatory impetus for the distinction made by the [marriage] statutes . . .
was implicit.”).
203. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 18. “The work we do today, and the issues we raise in this
debate are among the most profound that this country has ever discussed and among the most
import the country now faces.” Id.
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